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NOTES
BEATING PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS-
RECONCILING THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION WITH INDIVIDUAL
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
LESSONS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
AND RWANDA AS A FRONTISPIECE
INTRODUCTION
"And he shall judge among people and rebuke strong nations afar
off; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their
spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up a sword against
nation neither shall they learn war any more."*
This century has seen two attempts to bring about worldwide
consensus' among nation-states to promote universal peace and to
* Micah 4:3 (King James). See Isaiah 2:4.
1 See LELAND M. GOODRICH & ANNE P. SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTE-
NANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 9 (1955) (discussing short-lived post World
War I League of Nations initiative preceding inception of United Nations); Carol Weis
Brod, Minorities and Diversities: The Remarkable Experiment of the League of Nations, 8
CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 (1993) (noting creation of League of Nations and protection of
minorities in nation-states after WWI); Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations Security Coun-
cil Veto in the New World Order, 138 MIL. L. REv. 187, 226-27 (1992) (describing two at-
tempts at establishing central international authority); cf AMRY VANDENBOSCH & WILLARD
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avert global Armageddon and mankind's self-extinction in its
wake.2 The first attempt was the ambitious yet ultimately failed
League of Nations initiative. Its noble legacy paved the way to
the enduring yet limited effectiveness 4 at a second revitalized at-
tempt through the United Nations ("UN"). 5 The onset of the Cold
War6 severely compromised the authority of the UN's ideologi-
N. HOGAN, THE UNITED NATIONS BACKGROUND, ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, ACTITIES 93
(1952) (examining UN's collective security principle).
2 See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 3. The Charter describes one of the core imperatives to
be furthered through the U.N. as a result of the apocalyptic legacy left by World War II as
the ability "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.. . " Id.; see also Andrew S. Miller, Universal Soldiers: U.N.
Standing Armies and the Legal Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773, 773 (1993). The author ex-
plains the authority of the U.N. to deploy military force in furtherance of peaceful interna-
tional goals. Id. See generally An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking,
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N., G.A., 47th Sess., at 12-13, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992).
The U.N. Secretary-General, in a ground-breaking report commissioned by the Security
Council, called on member states to sign Article 43 Agreements and assume a permanent
legal obligation to make forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Security Council.
Id.; Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. Res. 39/11, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
No. 51, at 220, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985). This Resolution reaffirmed that one of the princi-
pal aims of the UN is "the preservation of the right of peoples to peace and the promotion of
its implementation constitute[s] a fundamental obligation of each State." Id.
3 See Eugene V. Rostow, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations
Law, Continued: Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 AM. J.
IN'L L. 506, 507 (1991) (explaining League of Nations only contained powers of persuasion
while United Nations can employ enforcement measures); cf. Jost Delbruck, The Role of the
United Nations in Dealing with Global Problems, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277, 277
(1997) (examining UN's role in diminishing states' rights and sovereignty). See generally
Robert M. Cassidy, Sovereignty Versus the Chimera of Armed Humanitarian Intervention,
21-Fall FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 47, 47 (1997) (exploring possible subversion of national
sovereignty in favor of humanitarian efforts).
4 See Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV.
575, 575-76 (discussing coming together of nation-states to justify and limit "the just war"
through League of Nations and thereafter United Nations); Sellen, supra note 1, at 227
(citing world's second attempt at centralized international authority through United Na-
tions); see also Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Au-
thority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 891 (1992) (stating U.N. possesses broader
authority to act against aggression than League of Nations); Rostow, supra note 3, at 507
(noting enforcement powers of U.N.).
5 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7 (directing that principle of non-intervention in States'
domestic affairs apply to all U.N. bodies, thus precluding their inclusion within General
Assembly's powers of discussion and recommendation); see also Christine Bourloyannis,
The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of International Hu-
manitarian Law, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 335, 335 (1992) (noting that in its first
twenty years United Nations played de minimis role in implementing international hu-
manitarian law); Sellen, supra note 1, at 187-88 (discussing how Cold War limited effective-
ness of Security Council). But see also Sellen, supra note 1, at 220 (recognizing U.N.'s abil-
ity to fulfill its original mandate).
6 See Oscar Schacter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452,
470-71 (1991) (stating that Cold War served to impede concept of collective security and
Gulf War demonstrated that Security Council, no longer hindered by Cold War, could cre-
ate sanctions of binding character and authorize military operations); see also David P.
Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum, 17
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cally-torn Security Council,7 as its permanent members, feuding
superpowers, constantly teetered on the brink of mutual annihila-
tion.8 Ultimately, with the end of the Cold War, the fall of the
communist bloc stranglehold on Eastern Europe,9 and the concom-
itant resurgence of war crimes and genocide, 10 the UN's role has
uneasily shifted from that of impartial arbiter to would-be mili-
tary enforcer. 1
MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 411 (1996) (describing increased activity of Security Council and
scrutiny on U.N. since end of Cold War); Bernard Kishoiyian, The United Nations: Meeting
the Challenges of the Post-Cold War World, 87 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 268, 277-78 (1993)
(discussing overwhelming volume of activity for U.N. since close of Cold War). cf Lawrence
Friedman, The Gulf War and the New World Order, 33 SURvIvAL 195, 195 (1991) (describ-
ing events of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as "test case" for new world order).
7 See Fidler, supra note 6, at 412 (noting that in years immediately after end of Cold War
activity of Security Council dramatically increased, subjecting it to "the spotlight of diplo-
matic and scholarly scrutiny"); see also Bruce Pruitt-Hamm, Humanitarian Intervention in
S.E. Asia in the Post Cold War World, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 183, 183 (1994) (analyzing
continuing dilemma for international law between fighting for justice while striving for
peace); cf Richard Lee Gaines, On the Road to a Pax U.N.: Using the Peace Tools at our
Disposal in a Post-Cold War World, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 543, 544 (1993) (discussing
structure for international peace and security).
8 See Krause, supra note 6, at 273 (noting that in post-Cold War era, "late-modem" age
of "transformation of the global political system" U.N. organization "has been the site for
contention between clashing views of the future"); see also Mats R. Berdal, The Security
Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict After the Cold War, 7 DUKE J. COMP & INT'L L.
71, 72 (1996) (examining relative ineffectiveness of post-Cold War U.N. peacekeeping ef-
forts); Bernard Kishoiyian, The United Nations Meeting the Challenge of the Post-Cold War
World, 87 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 268, 269 (1993) (questioning role of U.N. in post-Cold
War era and examing organization's reformation); cf. Inis L. Claude, Jr., The United Na-
tions of the Cold War: Contributions to the Post-Cold War Situation, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
789, 789 (1995) (discussing developments important for future roles of world organization).
9 See Vjekoslav Radovic, Eastern Europe: Upheavals in Eastern Europe Mark End of
Communism Says Djilas, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 31, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News File (reporting Milovan Dijlas' forecast of communist demise due to anti-
communist upheavals across Eastern Europe); Schacter, supra note 6, at 451 (asserting
that fall of Eastern Europe aided U.N. in better realizing its long term goals); see also
Stojan Cerovic, The Rise of Serbian Nationalism, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 527, 527-29
(1994) (suggesting that communism could not survive strength of nationalistic feelings);
Marlise Simons, Upheaval in the East; Yugoslavia Catching East Europe's Political Fever,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan 21, 1990, § 1, at 1 (describing Yugoslavia's move towards self-
determination).
10 See Roger Cohen, End of Cold War Offers Chilling New Dangers, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 26, 1994, at 15A (describing eruption of ethnic and religious conflicts
after collapse of Communism); Yugoslav Police Try to Prevent Flareups Between Ethnic
Groups, CHic. TRiU., Aug. 18, 1990, at 9 (reporting strong support by state-run media in
Serbia for Croatian Serbs and characterization of Croatian government as "fascist"); see
also Kathy Lewis, Bush Says Aid, Sanctions Must Work in Bosnia: Military Leaders Plan
for Yugoslavia Blockade, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, July 10, 1992, at 1A (noting that crimes
and atrocities developed from rampant nationalism after end of Cold War); cf Nesho
Djuric, Serbia Sends Police to Strife-Torn Region, THE RECORD (No. N.J.), Mar. 26, 1990, at
A06, available in 1990 WL 6909470 (describing ethnic tensions in former Yugoslavia).
11 See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. The Security Council has the vested authority to
raise and mobilize a U.N.-backed military force. Id.; U.N. CHARTER art. 42, para 42. The
Council has wide latitude to undertake collective (military) measures against aggression.
Id.; see also Martti Koshenniemi, A Symposium on Reenvisioning the Security Council: The
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Of the UJN's six major entities, 12 the General Assembly and the
Social and Economic Council are the two principal components re-
sponsible for monitoring international human rights violations.13
The UN's various commissions and their subsidiary monitoring
committees 14 are delegated the responsibility of conducting stud-
ies and investigations, compiling findings-regarding interna-
tional human rights violations, for example-and drafting propos-
als for ratification by member States. 5 Nevertheless, to date,
neither the General Assembly nor any of its subsidiary monitoring
committees has successfully enforced the condemnations of the in-
ternational human rights violations committed in the former Yu-
goslavia and Rwanda. 6 This problem of ineffectiveness exists be-
Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455, 456-58 (1996). The article
chronicles the military and non-military actions of the U.N. since 1988. Id.; Oscar Schacter,
In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 122 (1986).
The author emphasizes that states try to avoid condemnation by an international organ,
and that such condemnation, although not binding, still imposes political costs. Id. But see
VANDENBOSCH & HOGAN, supra note 1, at 300. The authors observe that the world commu-
nity created the Commission on Human Rights as a preventative measure against war,
thereby recognizing that the power to respond to aggression alone is not a cure. Id.
12 See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-32 (setting forth composition, hierarchy, roles, and
functions of U.N.); Antonio Cassese, A New Approach to Human Rights: The European Con-
vention for the Prevention of Torture, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 128-45 (1989) (citing specific
conventions recognizing rights of women, minorities, refugees, civil rights, and right
against torture); Nicole M. Procida, Note, Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, A Case
Study: Employing United Nations Mechanisms to Enforce the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 655, 659 (1995)
(discussing six principal U.N. organs and numerous committees that deal with human
rights).
13 See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 3 (encouraging respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all); Id. arts. 10-13 (discussing functions and powers of General As-
sembly); Procida, supra note 12, at 659 (discussing how General Assembly and Social and
Economic Council deal with human rights violations). See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-
32 (delineating hierarchy and structure of U.N. organs and subsidiaries).
14 See Elizabeth J. Evatt, International Machinery on Human Rights, 4 Q. INST. TECH.
L.J. ANN. 55, 56 (1988) (delineating structure and functions of U.N. human rights organiza-
tions); see also Martin A. Olz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights
Systems, 28 COLUM. Hum. RTs. L. REV. 307, 308-12 (1997) (detailing functions of non-gov-
ernmental organizations that promote human rights); cf. B.G. Ramcharan, Reforming the
United Nations to Secure Human Rights, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 503, 504
(1994) (examining changes that can bolster effectiveness of human rights organizations).
15 See Rupa Bhattacharyya, Symposium on Humanitarian Intervention and Interna-
tional Criminal Justice: Establishing a Rule-of-Law International Justice System, 31 TEx.
INTL L.J. 57, 61-62 (1996) (discussing ad hoc tribunals as "a beginning" towards establish-
ing international criminal tribunal to deal with situation in former Yugoslavia); see also
VANDENBOSCH & HOGAN, supra note 1, at 112 (discussing responsibilities and authority of
U.N. organs); Id. at 300 (outlining creation of Commission of Human Rights).
16 See Evatt, supra note 14, at 56 (analyzing mechanisms involved in human rights cove-
nants for investigating alleged violations in which most conventions contain committee of
experts which supervise implementation of conventions and reports to General Assembly);
Yogesh K Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L.
883, 884-86 (1995) (discussing reasons why U.N. gets involved in humanitarian interven-
tion efforts); see also Bourloyannis, supra note 5, at 335 (indicating that states agree to
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cause the promulgation of human rights guidelines via the UN's
authority has not been augmented by a similarly authoritative in-
itiative for their effective enforcement.'" The harsh reality of this
problem is underscored by the UN's uphill struggle to carry out
indictments against the architects of mass rape and genocide in
the regions of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. i8 This bleak
picture has been further frustrated by the intense, trans-genera-
tional ethno-racial hatred deeply mired in the violent histories of
these two countries 19-which has proven doggedly impervious to
the UN's authority.
fact-finding missions for human rights violations to avoid bad publicity). See generally Ruth
E. Gordon, Intervention By the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia and Haiti, 31 Tax. IN'L L.J.
43, 51-56 (1996) (concluding that U.N. could be more effective in dealing with humanita-
rian interventions).
17 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Draft Code of Offenses Against Peace and Security, 75
A.J.I.L. 674, 674-75 (1981) (noting International Law Commission created in 1947 to pre-
pare code of offenses remains incomplete); Barry M. Schiller, Life in a Symbolic Universe:
Comments on the Genocide Convention and International Law, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 47, 68
(1977) (questioning Convention's ability to punish genocide perpetrators without interna-
tional criminal justice system); see also Note, Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention,
58 YALE L.J. 1142, 1151-57 (1949) (describing U.N.'s request to study feasibility of world
court to punish violators of humanitarian law); cf. Tyagi, supra note 16, at 906-07 (pointing
out many inadequacies and weaknesses in international law preventing U.N. humanita-
rian operations from leading to peace).
18 See Payam Akhavan, The International Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 501 (1996) (describing policies of
Rwandan and Yugoslavian Tribunals and import of their coexistence); Richard Goldstone,
Assessing the Work of the International War Crimes Tribunal, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2
(1997) (addressing achievements and failures of Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes
Tribunals established by UN Security Council); Richard Goldstone, Symposium: Prosecut-
ing International Crimes: An Inside View, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PaOBS. 1, 2 (1997)
(discussing the advantages of ad hoc tribunals and international community's commitment
to punishing war criminals); Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military
Culture, 45 DuKE L.J. 651, 651-54 (1996) (evaluating proposals that seek to reduce war-
time rapes by military personnel).
19 See Ruti Teitel, Identifying and Prosecuting War Crimes: The Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 631, 631 (1996) (exploring issues surrounding war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity); see also Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized:
The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49,
50 (1995) (outlining intricacies of inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda and Burundi); Eric
Black, The Balkans, STAR TmB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 15, 1993, at 24A, available in
1993 WL 11324104 (explaining historical origins of intense and bitter hatred between
closely knit Serb and Croat peoples).
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I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Resurrecting the Specter of Genocide: Yugoslavia
The wave of "self-determination" sweeping across Europe 20 on
the heels of the Iron Curtain's fall,21 on the one hand served as the
basis for formerly repressed peoples to reassert their unique cul-
tural and political identities.2 2 In the case of the former Yugosla-
via, however, this "wave" also stirred the slumbering specter of
centuries-old hatred, polarizing its ethno-religious populations
into distinct, nationalist movements.23 Initially, this resulted in
the violent dissolution and reorganization of the former Yugoslav-
ian polity into the three new States of Croatia, Slovenia and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. 26 The price of this newly-asserted sovereign au-
20 See Albania: Albanian Leader Dismisses Unrest Reports, Denounces Yugoslavia, REU-
TER NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, News File (reporting
that Soviet reforms unleashed waves of popular unrest throughout Eastern Europe); see
also Bob Keeler, After the Fall, Chaos, Violence, Uncertainty Follow the Soviet Union's Col-
lapse, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec. 31, 1992, at 95, available in 1992 WL 7575675 (recount-
ing fragmentation of nations within one year after demise of Soviet Union); Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr., Self-Determination: Yes, but..., WALL ST. J. (Europe), Sept. 30, 1991, at 6,
available in 1991 WL-WSJE-2012469 (stating that dissolution of Soviet Union led to disin-
tegration of Iron Curtain); Jon Stewart, U.S. Indecision Contributing to World's Growing
Disarray, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 1994, at All (relating World Affairs Council discussion on
problems in Europe since end of Cold War and development of new political order).
21 See Cohen, supra note 10, at 15A (noting systematic disintegration of Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia since fall of Communism); David Kennedy, Turning a Mar-
ket Democracy: A Tale of Two Architectures, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 373 (1991) (examining
scope of changes in Europe since fall of Berlin Wall and what future holds); Schlesinger,
supra note 20, at 6 (tracing back fall of Soviet Union historically); see also Francis A. Gabor,
Reflections on the Freedom of Movement in Light of the Dismantled "Iron Curtain", 65 TUL.
L. REV. 849, 850 (1991) (addressing freedom of movement concept after fall of "iron
curtain").
22 See Klas Bergman, Yugoslav President Calls for Talks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb.
9, 1990, at 3 (addressing Yugoslav parliament, Yugoslavia's President commented that:
"Nationality has been placed above everything else and has become more important than
democracy, economic success, and individual human rights"); Peter Humphrey, Romania:
Balkans Seek to Heal Rifts and Enter Europe, REUTER NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 23, 1990, avail-
able in 1990 WL 427897 (reporting that Communism's collapse in Eastern Europe un-
leashed nationalist and ethnic turmoil in Southeastern Europe); see also Nathaniel
Berman, Between "Alliance" and "Localization". Nationalism and the New Oscillationism,
26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 449, 470 (1994) (stating that "[in the Europe of today, after the
wave of freedom it has just experienced, the right of peoples to self-determination cannot be
challenged anywhere").
23 See Berman, supra note 22, at 470 (asserting that self-determination was product of
nationalism which ultimately leads to violence); John Tagliabue, Conflict in Yugoslavia,
N.Y. TumEs, July 3, 1991, at A6 (characterizing political successors in Yugoslavia as former
communist turncoats actively evoking old national aspirations); see also Bergman, supra
note 22, at 3 (relating Yugoslavian President's emphasis on importance of "nationality"
even above individual human rights); Black, supra note 19, at 24A (describing history of
Yugoslavia and splits between its diverse ethno-religious factions).
24 See Terry Atlas, U.S. Set to Recognize 3 Yugoslav Republics, CHI. TRm., Apr. 7, 1992,
at 3 (describing U.S. policy in recognizing new states previously part of former Yugoslavia);
Yehuda Z. Blum, U.N. Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break, 86 AM. J.
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tonomy was all-out civil war, incited by the likes of former
Communist Party boss, Slobodan Milosevic, recasting himself as a
heroic cultural revivalist, 25 and the opportunistic military tyrant,
Radovan Karadzic, rallying ethnic hatred under a banner of "na-
tionalism."26 In particular, the "ethnic cleansing" campaign,2 7
achieved primarily through the mass rape of Muslim women, and
generally attributed to Karadzic, has been the focus of great inter-
INT'L L. 830, 830 (1992) (noting recognition of three new member states into U.N.); see also
Black, supra note 19, at 24A (examining current war between different states of former
Yugoslavia); cf. Blaine Harden, Balkan Elections Signal Failure of "Yugoslavism", WASH.
POST, May 1, 1990, at A14 (reporting protest demonstrations by ethnic Albanians were
violently suppressed by Serbian police after attempt by Milosevic to install puppet Serbian
government in Kosovo, area populated by 1.7 million Albanian majority); Andrej Gustincic,
500,000 Serbs Protest Strike By Ethnic Albanians, WASH. POST, March 1, 1989, at A19 (dis-
cussing Slovenia and Croatia's fear that Milosevic wanted to restore Serbia's dominance in
Yugoslavia).
25 See Tagliabue, supra note 23, at A6 (referring to former Communist turncoats as
evoking nationalism); see also Berman, supra note 22, at 470-71 (describing power of na-
tionalism in Balkan Republic); Cerovic, supra note 9, at 527-30 (detailing rise of national-
ism in former Yugoslavia); Bergman, supra note 22, at 3 (suggesting that "nationalism" is
considered more important than democracy in new Balkan Republics); Aleksa Dijlas, A
Profile of Slobodan Milosevic, FOREIGN AFF. Sum., 1993, at 95 (discussing Milosevic's ideo-
logical transition from Communism to nationalism).
26 See Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia, CROATIAN INFO. CENTER, 107,
107 (1993) [hereinafter CROATIAN INFO. CENTER]. Radovan Karadzic has publicly voiced his
belief that only Serbians should populate his republic. Id. Karadzic publicly admitted that
he envisioned ninety-five percent of the Serbian Republic's population would be of Serbian
origin. Id. The great heterogeneity and non-Serbian dominance prior to armed conflict of
areas now claimed by Karadzic's forces, however, belies a policy of ethnic cleansing being
carried out by the Serbs. Id.; see also II HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-
HERCEGOVINA 8-9 (1993). To date no reports have indicated that Serb leaders have held
accountable any member of their forces for human rights violations. Id.; cf Roy Gutman,
Viewpoints: U.S. Indifference Crippled Bosnia, NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 16, 1993, at 99,
available in 1993 WL 11393846. The author discusses the extreme nationalist ideology that
leads to ethnic cleansing. Id.
27 See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 780 (1992), at 33, available in U.N. Gopher/Current Information/Secretary-
General's Reports. U.N. experts assert that parties to the Bosnian armed conflict have en-
gaged in "ethnic cleansing," which "means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from that area." Id.; Human
Rights in the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human rights, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Item 97, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (1992) [hereinafter
Human Rights Report]. The report defines ethnic cleansing as the elimination of one ethnic
group from the same territory that is controlled by another ethnic group. Id.; Roger Cohen,
Serb Defector Offers Evidence on War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A12. A defector
from the Yugoslavian Secret Police produced documents indicating that Yugoslavian au-
thorities were explicitly directing the ethnic cleansing campaign carried out by the Bosnian
Serbs holding command and control authority over both the armed forces and de facto gov-
ernment structures. Id.; see also H.D.S. Greenway, Balkan Divide Is Again Europe's
Flashpoint in a Post-Soviet 'Void'; Yugoslavia Is Again Splintered Into its Tribes, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 4, 1992, at 18, available in 1992 WL 4204145. The article defines ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia as the forced removal of Croats and Muslims from their
homes by Serbian forces. Id.; Gutman, supra note 26, at 99. The author analogizes the
ethnic cleansing of Bosnia to that of Nazi Germany over fifty years ago. Id.
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national attention and outrage. 28 Ironically, despite this atten-
tion, the extant reaction by way of UN initiatives has engendered
limited success.29
B. A Veritable Holocaust Revisited: Rwanda
Contemporaneous with the horrific events taking place in Bos-
nia, a strikingly similar scenario of genocide was unfolding in the
African nation of Rwanda.3" In early 1994, a tragic civil war fueled
by age-old ethnic rivalry, tore Rwanda asunder1.3  The hostilities
quickly resulted in the dislocation and political extermination of
more than 500,000 innocent civilians comprised mostly of two eth-
28 See Cohen, supra note 27, at Al (reporting that former member of Serbian secret po-
lice turned over documents to tribunal thereby incriminating Milosevic for authorizing war
crimes); see also Rachel Bart, Using American Courts to Prosecute International Crimes
Against Women: Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzic and S. Kadic v. Radovan Karadzic, 3 CAR-
DOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 467, 467 (1996) (citing most egregious human rights violations of wo-
men in this century and arguing for more effective prosecution of military officials who
orchestrated systematic rape of Muslim women in former Yugoslavia); Sharon A. Healey,
Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
21 BROOK. J. IN'rl' L. 327, 327 (1995) (examining legal precedent for prosecuting Serbian
officials for mass rapes committed in former Yugoslavia); cf Michelle Brandt, Doe v.
Karadzic: Redressing Non-State Acts of Gender-Specific Abuse Under the Alien Tort Statute,
79 MINN. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1995) (outlining framework for adjudication of war crimes
under Alien Tort Statute).
29 See II HEasINu WATCH, supra note 26, at 242. It was reported that '[i]n southeastern
Bosnia, Serbian forces use rape as one of many methods of torturing and humiliating wo-
men." Id. Further, many women and their families are forcibly expelled from their villages,
put into detention facilities, and "[the women are sexually mistreated during their deten-
tion ... and many are gang-raped .... " Id.; Roy Gutman, A Daily Ritual of Sex Abuse,
NEWSDAY (New York), Apr. 19, 1993, at 5, available in 1993 WL 11367180. The author cites
the rapes of Bosnian women by members of the Serb military. Id. See generally Human
Rights Report, supra note 27, at 6. The report sets forth the Special Rapporteur's accounts
of human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia.
30 See Akhavan, supra note 18, at 502 (describing co-existence of Yugoslavian and
Rwandan tribunals); Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law:
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INer'L L. 421, 421 (1994) (ana-
lyzing innovations reflected in policies of international criminal tribunal for Rwanda); see
also Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. Comp. & INFTL
L. 325, 325 (1997) (discussing Rwandan tribunal and its potential impact on peace in Lake
Region of Africa); Michael G. Karnavas, Rwanda's Quest for Justice: National and Interna-
tional Efforts and Challenges, 21-May CHAMPION 16, 17 (1997) (examining how justice can
be carried out given government involvement in Rwandan genocide).
31 See Akhavan, supra note 18, at 502-06 (citing factors that led to civil war, atrocities
that followed and subsequent establishment of Rwandan Tribunal); William Schabas, Jus-
tice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impos-
sible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 524 (1996) (outlining causes of Rwanda's civil war, effect
that atrocities committed will have on international community, and policies established to
confront such situations). See generally Melissa Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 I.L.S.A. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 217
(1995) (detailing need for Rwandan Tribunal and for ICC); Faculty, Judge Advocate Gen-
eral Law School, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1995 in Review, 1996-Apr
ARMY LAW. 40, 41 (1996) (noting successes and failures of Rwandan Tribunal).
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nic factions: Tutus and moderate Hutus.3 2 As a result, an ad hoc
criminal court, in effect a complement to the International War
Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [hereinafter "ICTY"),
was created in 1994 for Rwanda by the UN Security Council to
indict the perpetrators of the widespread ethnic slaughter.33 In
February of 1997, however, a two-month investigation conducted
by the UN Inspector General revealed "widespread mismanage-
ment" and "rule-breaking" in which no "single administrative
area" of the Rwandan Tribunal [hereinafter "ICTR"] "functioned
effectively. 34
C. Desperate Times and Desperate Measures
In no uncertain terms, the foregoing bespoke of the relative inef-
fectiveness of the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal in routing out
war criminals and delivering justice.3 5 Indeed, the limited juridi-
32 See Mary Ellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution
Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL IN'L L.J. 505, 506 (1993)
(focusing on how individuals' membership in specific groups can drastically affect ways
they are treated in given situations); see also M.A. Stapleton, World Justice Requires Full-
Time Body: Advocate, CH. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 14, 1997, at 3 (describing work of prepara-
tory committee examining feasibility of establishing permanent international criminal tri-
bunal); cf Tara Sapru, Into the Heart of Darkness: The Case Against the Foray of the Secur-
ity Council into the Rwandan Crisis, 32 TEx. IN'L L.J. 329, 331 (1997) (examining
constitutionality of U.N.'s establishment of International Tribunal for Rwanda).
33 See Akhavan, supra note 18, at 502 (describing goals and responsibilities of Rwandan
Tribunal); see also Gordon, supra note 31, at 219 (emphasizing urgency for Rwandan Tribu-
nal as well as for ICC); Dennis J. Mitchell, All Is Not Fair in War: The Need for a Perma-
nent War Crimes Tribunal, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1996) (examining prior War
Crimes Tribunals and feasibility of establishing permanent ICC). See generally Mark Von
Sternberg, A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Univer-
sal Jurisdiction and the Elementary Dictates of Humanity, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 111
(1996) (analyzing subject matter jurisdiction of both Yugoslavian and Rwandan War
Crimes Tribunals under Chapter VII of U.N. Charter).
34 See Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11
TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 167, 168 (1997) (casting doubts on effect ICTY and ICTR will have
on human rights violations as barbaric as those committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda);
Stapleton, supra note 32, at 3 (asserting that Rwandan and Yugoslavian tribunals were
mismanaged and criticized as being ineffective); see also Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening
Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INr'L L. 127, 127 (1995) (emphasizing importance of
strong humanitarian law that will deter atrocities like those of Rwanda); William A.
Schabas, Sentencing By International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE
COMP. INT'L L. 461, 461-62 (1997) (addressing issues raised in sentencing offenders before
international war crimes tribunals).
35 See Mariann Meier Wang, The International Tribunal for Rwanda: Opportunities for
Clarification, Opportunities for Impact, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 177, 177-78 (1995)
(conceding existence of problems with Tribunals overall, but calling for support from inter-
national community in order for Rwandan Tribunal to assist in rebuilding Rwandan justice
system); see also Kimberly Barnes, International Law, the United Nations, and Interven-
tion in Civil Conflicts, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 117, 118 (1995) (proposing solution
to conflict that exists between international law and reaction of international community to
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cal effectiveness of both the ICTY and the ICTR became self-evi-
dent almost from their respective inceptions.3 6 Reacting in large
part to mounting concerns over the War Crimes Tribunals' virtu-
ally nonexistent authority, and thereby foreseeing the urgency to
implement a more permanent juridical remedy, on November 8,
1996, the International Law Commission of the UN finally
adopted a draft code of "crimes against the peace and security of
mankind."37 In due course, by December 17, 1996, taking another
affirmative step toward the contemplated promulgation of an In-
ternational Criminal Court [hereinafter "ICC"], the UN General
Assembly adopted Resolution 51/207, calling for a diplomatic con-
ference in Rome, Italy in 1998.38 The goal of the proposed confer-
ence will be to iron out the details and open for signature a con-
vention that would at last establish the long awaited ICC.3 9
civil wars); cf. David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 401, 401 (1994) (describing political factors involved in establish-
ment and disposition of Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal).
36 See Wang, supra note 35, at 188-89 (describing problems with Rwandan War Crimes
Tribunal); see also Sheila O'Shea, Interaction Between International Criminal Tribunals
and National Legal Systems, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 367, 367-68 (1996) (examining ad
hoc tribunals and provisions designed to foster cooperation between these tribunals and
national legal systems). But see Goldstone, supra note 18, at 12 (discussing pitfalls over-
come in establishing war crimes tribunals as well as assessing accomplishments).
37 See U.N. Draft Code of "Crimes Against Mankind" Sent to General Assembly, WES'S
LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 13, 1996, at 12079, available in 1996 WL 655008 (providing insight into
"Crimes Against Mankind Code" proposed by U.N.); see also John Linarelli, An Examina-
tion of the Proposed Crime of Intervention in the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNATL L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) (detailing Draft Code
provisions and Code's anticipated impact on international community); Ndiva Kofeli-Kale,
Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAD. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 48 (1995) (analyzing impact of Code of Crimes Against Peace and Secur-
ity of Mankind on national sovereignty); Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law
Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F. 43, 44 (1997) (discussing draft code, its evolution and possible
import of code in its final form).
38 See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A. Res. 51/207, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., 88th Plenary mtg., Agenda Item 147, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/51/207 (1996) (convening
for ratification via Resolution 51/207, 1998 Convention to establish ICC); see also Richard
J. Wilson, A Permanent International Criminal Court: Soon to Be a Reality, 4 HuM. RTS.
BRIEF 1 (1997) (announcing U.N.'s long-awaited resolution demonstrating consensus
among member nations to implement ICC); Christopher Keith Hall, The First Two Sessions
of the U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 177, 178 (1997) (outlining progress made at U.N.'s International
Criminal Court preparation meetings); Rayfuse, supra note 37, at 44 (citing evolution of
draft code as well as its impact in completed form).
39 See Wilson, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing proposed diplomatic conference in Rome,
Italy in 1998 in anticipatory ratification of ICC convention); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Establishing an International Criminal Court: Historical Survey, 149 MIL. L. REV. 49, 53
(1995) (assessing previous attempts at carrying out international justice and looking at
possibilities for future organizations and their likelihood of success); Nancy E. Guffey-
Landers, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Will it Do Justice?, 20 MD. J. INTL
L. & TRADE 199, 201 (1996) (discussing existing system for carrying out international jus-
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For conciseness' sake, the scope of this Note will limit itself to
examining the utility of the proposed ICC in particular view of the
unpunished atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia. More
specifically, this Note will examine the UN's relatively passive
stance 40 in light of the ongoing wave of war crimes and genocidal
atrocities unleashed on Bosnian civilians.41 Clearly, the magni-
tude of such crimes, 42 as evidenced by their ferocity and frequency
in this century alone, 43 and the UN's relative ineffectiveness as
global peacekeeper, 44 justifies the promulgation of an independent
tice and analyzing proposals for international criminal court); Michael P. Scharf, The Poli-
tics of Establishing an International Criminal Court, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167, 167
(1995) (exploring political currents at work in establishment of International Criminal
Court).
40 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 7 (recognizing sovereign equality of all states and
principle of non-intervention, and intervention in affairs of member states requires Secur-
ity Council to conclude that matter on which it intends to act is not matter essentially
within domestic jurisdiction of state); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on UN In-
tervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903, 909 (1992) (noting that U.N. did not play role in
early part of Balkans war); see also Mark Helprin, Beyond the Cold War; Foreign Policy in
the 21st Century: Stay Out of Bosnia, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1993, at A20 (advocating that
U.N. and United States not get involved in Bosnian civil war); Elizabeth Neuffer, U.N. Says
Effort in Bosnia Is Hurt By Lack of Troops, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 1994, at 8, available in
WL 5982271 (describing U.N. Member states as refusing to commit troops to Bosnia). But
see Josh Friedman, U.N. Authorizes Use of Force in Bosnia Havens, L.A. TIMEs, June 5,
1993, at 1, available in 1993 WL 2308316 (noting actions taken by U.N., its goals and
future steps in protecting safe havens established in Bosnia).
41 See II HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 26, at 50. The Watch cites "civilians ... being
summarily executed as part of an 'ethnic cleansing' campaign." Id. Other reports indicated
that Bosnian-Serb forces conducted mass executions of whole non-Serb village populations
to "cleanse" areas. Id. at 63; Keeler, supra note 20, at 95. The author relates that brutality
and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have resulted from nationalist movements. Id.; see also
Greenway, supra note 27, at 18. Yugoslavia's tortured sociopolitical history inevitably led
to the brutality of war and ethnic cleansing. Id.
42 See Helsinki International Federation for Human Rights, ANN. REP. OF ACTIvITIES, 67,
68 (1992) [hereinafter Helsinki Report, 19921. Recognizing the widespread proliferation of
atrocities on civilians, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights condemned the systematic
killing, torture, rape, and forced displacement associated with ethnic cleansing for which
the Serb leadership and military forces in Bosnia were responsible. Id.; see also II HELSINKI
WATCH, supra note 26, at 242. The report details the torture and human rights violations in
Bosnia. Id.; Human Rights Report, supra note 27, at 6. The Special Rapporteur recounted
barbaric acts of "ethnic cleansing" being committed in the former Yugoslavia. Id.
43 See Schacter, supra note 11, at 125. The continued frequency of violent international
acts demonstrates the failure of the U.N.'s collective security system. Id. Emerging from
the Nuremberg Nazi trials were the principles that "affirmed in unmistakable terms that
aggressive war is illegal and that persons responsible for such wars are guilty of an inter-
national crime." Id. at 113; see also Larry A. McCullough, International and Domestic
Criminal Law Issues in the Achille Lauro Incident: A Functional Analysis, 36 NAVAL L.
REV. 53, 54 (1986). The frequency of terrorist attacks in the mid-1980's signified the begin-
ning of a new era whose violence the world political order found itself ill-prepared to pre-
vent. Id.
44 See LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 164 (1989). The ratification of a
Human Rights Convention is no guarantee against human rights violations. Id. Histori-
cally, U.N. intervention has been limited to humanitarian relief and diplomatic processes,
falling short of military intervention. Id. Therefore, a major rift exists between the ideals
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judicial authority4' by way of an ICC 41 through Resolution 51/
207.47 In view of this, the proposed implementation of an ICC will
elevate the UN's credibility and authority within the sphere of
world affairs.
In sum, the UN's delayed reaction to widely publicized acts of
Bosnian genocide and its failure to take affirmative steps in en-
forcing the recent indictments of Bosnian war criminals like Serb
President Karadzic, have further undermined the UN's already
tenuous credibility and authority in the eyes of the global commu-
nity and exemplify the dire need for an ICC. 48 Part I of this Note
expressed in human rights covenants and their practical implementation. Id. See generally
Kelly A. Childers, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan Wars and the Chang-
ing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold War World, 8 TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L.J.
117, 117 (1994). The article discusses the role of peacekeepers in the new world order and
suggests new ways for them to address their missions. Id.
45 See Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memo-
randum Submitted by the Secretary-General, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949).
Prompted in part by the "victor's justice" legacy of the post-WWII war crimes prosecutions,
the General Assembly pushed for a statute and a draft code towards the establishment of a
permanent ICC. Id. Broad international representation on an International Criminal
Court would mark a much needed departure from post-World War II war crimes tribunals
which were composed entirely of representatives of the victorious Allied nations. Id. at 26;
see also Johan D. van den Vyven, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and
International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321, 326 (1991). The author states that ancient
scholars considered the judiciary to be the ultimate repository of sovereignty. Id.
46 See M. CHERIF BAssIoUnI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STAT-
UTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 3 (1987) (positing that Nuremberg and To-
kyo Tribunals represented only one stage in development of system of international crimi-
nal law which is to be ultimately administered through permanent International Criminal
Court); cf Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary
Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 42 (1995) (suggesting that since U.N. has become
center of collective security system, it should supervise implementation of laws of war).
47 See Wilson, supra note 38, at 1 (reporting on upcoming 1998 UN diplomatic conference
for ratification of ICC); Difficulty of Providing Military Support for Humanitarian Opera-
tions While Ensuring Impartiality, M2 PREsswIRE, May 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10370311 (reporting that establishment of war crimes tribunals to adjudicate violations of
humanitarian law were critical step towards removing impunity and improving protection
of victims); see also U.S. Policy Towards Bosnia, 1996, Hearing of the House Committee on
International Relations, FED. NEWS SERVICE, April 23, 1996, available in Lexis Nexis Li-
brary, News File (stating that ICC must be established to take into account atrocities car-
ried out over years and to ensure lasting peace); cf. Trevor Royle, Who Should Punish Mon-
sters Like Pol Pot for their Terrible Crimes Against Humanity?, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Aug.
3, 1997, at 15 (noting that obstacles of enforcement of new world order and necessity of
gaining permission of national governments before investigating can be overcome by ap-
pointment of court independent of Security Council).
48 See Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. A/49/342, S/199411007, at 49 (1994) [hereinafter
Report of the International Tribunal] (reporting on the ICTY's progress in the prosecution
of war crimes committed against civilians of former Yugoslavia thereby demonstrating
ICTY's relative ineffectiveness and undermined credibility); see also Stefanie Grant,
Human Rights: Hague Court Tackles Both Yugoslav and Rwandan Crimes, INTER PRESS
SERV., April 7, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2260282 (assessing that ICTY was "bedeviled"
by unrealistic expectations promulgated by overzealous media creating public misconcep-
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has sought to cursorily review the complex ethnic, social and polit-
ical mechanics of the Balkan and Rwandan crises. Part II exam-
ines the controversial role of the ICTY, a well-intentioned yet inef-
fective tool in curbing war crimes, and as an opus toward the re-
enfranchisement of the UN's authority. Part III argues that the
relative failure of the ICTY to respond to Bosnian atrocities man-
dates the promulgation of a judicially autonomous ICC, supersed-
ing the UN's current scope of authority, to re-establish and main-
tain world order in ultimate fulfillment of the UN Charter. This
essay concludes that in light of the UN's failed ICTY initiative, an
ICC, presiding unhampered by current UN constraints, will help
restore the UN's authority and credibility in the international
arena.
II. BOSNIA: THE TRAGEDY THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED
A. War Crimes and Genocide in the Former Yugoslavia:
Political Opportunists Inculcate Ethnic Hatred
The recent ethnic and territorial claims being made to the land
called Bosnia-Herzegovina have a long and bloodied history.49 The
peoples of the former Yugoslavian Republic consist predominantly
of Muslims, Croats, Slovenes and Serbs. 50 While they all share a
tion that "press reporting can seamlessly translate into hard evidence necessary for crimi-
nal prosecution"); Sarah Helm, Balkan Atrocities Before the Courts, INDEPENDENT (London),
Nov. 5, 1995, at 13 (reporting that Serbian testimony began to correct perceived imbalance
of justice which had undermined ICTY's credibility); Andrew Kelly, U.N. War Crimes Tri-
bunal Building Authority, REUTERS NEWS SEav., April 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News File (noting that since ICTY's inception its authority and credibility were
compromised by financial problems, resignation of its first prosecutor, and reluctance of
foreign peace force in Bosnia to track down and arrest war criminals).
49 See Michael Barutciski, Politics Overrides Legal Principles: Tragic Consequences of
the Diplomatic Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991-1992), 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 449, 470 (1994) (outlining history of Balkans region); Tomislav Sunic, The Missing
Links in Yugoslavia's Tragedy, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1994, at A17 (providing summary of
modem state of affairs between peoples of former Yugoslavia leading to Bosnian conflict)
[Sunic is an official in Croatia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Zagreb]; see also Black, supra
note 19, at 24A (giving historical overview of Balkan conflict); Greenway, supra note 27, at
18 (detailing history of Balkan conflict); cf. A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Con-
cept of Jus Cogens As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1,
2-9 (1995) (chronicling fighting and animosity among Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethno-racial
factions).
50 See Peter J. Cannon, The Third Balkan War and Political Disunity: Creating a Con-
federated Cantonal Constitutional System, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'y 373, 405 (1996). It is
postulated that:
The demographic distribution of the major ethnicities reveal that they are spread
throughout the various regions. Prior to the current war, the Serbs accounted for
13.2% of Kosovo, 54.4% of Vojvodina, 11.5% of Croatia, and 32% of Bosnia-Herzego-
vina. The Croats, the second most numerous of peoples in the Balkans, are dispersed
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common language and Slavic cultural background, the Muslims
are Islamic converts of Ottoman Turkish descent, the Serbs are
Orthodox Christians, and the Slovenes and Croats are Catholics.5
This religious and ethnic diversity within such close territorial
borders has often made for a very volatile political climate.52 In-
deed, the assassination of Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, the cata-
lyst of World War I, was an early political statement by Serbs
seeking to assert territorial independence.53 In effect, this single
event presaged decades of inescapable ethnic and religious hostil-
throughout. In Croatia, Croats make up approximately 75% of the population. They
account for 18.4% of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1.4% of Montenegro, 2.9% of Slovenia, .5% of
Serbia, and 5.4% of Vojvodina. Finally, the Muslims account for the largest percent of
Bosnia-Herzegovina with 39.5%, while occupying small percentages elsewhere.
Id. at 405; Erik D. Gordy, Yugoslavia's History of Cooperation, CHI. Tma., Mar. 19, 1993, at
19, available in 1993 WL 11051386. The author notes that despite their long history of
ethno-religious conflict, the former Yugoslavia's three predominant ethnicities have a his-
tory of interacting on a relatively peaceful and civilly cooperative basis. Id.; Sunic, supra
note 49, at A17. Sunic, however, posits that in the former Yugoslavia, each ethnic group
pretended to love another ethnic group, while secretly thinking of how to part company
with the other. Id.; see also Bergman, supra note 22, at 3. Bergman cites the rift within the
former Yugoslavia, noting that "the northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia urg[ed] a
peaceful solution, while Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic [gave] no indication of any read-
iness to compromise." Id.
51 See I HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 20 (1992) (detailing
ethno-religious backgrounds of peoples of former Yugoslavia); see also Cerovic, supra note
9, at 527 (explaining reasons behind Balkans conflict and noting that former Yugoslavia
was country "forged" from diverse minorities); Christian J. Garris, Comment, Bosnia and
the Limitations of International Law, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1039, 1087 (1994) (stating
that "[rieligion has not been an essential factor in the history of Yugoslavia and of Bosnia
in particular; lines were [artificially] drawn on the basis of religion resulting in the present
seemingly unresolvable schisms between Muslims, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats").
See generally Lisa L. Schmandt, Peace with Justice: Is it Possible for the Former Yugosla-
via?, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 335, 337 (1995) (asserting that different religions and ethnic history
have fostered hatred among groups).
52 See Into Bosnia, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1992, at 14 (noting that despite limited occur-
rences of intermarriage between three major ethnicities, "intensity of ethnic and religious
rivalry has not diminished, nor has the ferocity with which it is expressed"); see also CROA-
TIAN INFO. CENTER, supra note 26, at 107 (discussing how ethnic and religious differences
have made for hostile, feuding atmosphere in Bosnia). But see Gordy, supra note 50, at 19
(noting despite ethno-religious differences, there is tendency for harmony among diverse
Bosnian population).
53 See BARBARA JELAVICH, HISTORY OF THE BALKANS 296 (1989) (noting forced geopolitical
co-existence of diverse peoples constitutes shaky basis for peace); see also Austrian Pressure
on Servia, TIMES (London), July 24, 1997, at 23, available in 1997 WL 9217960 (noting
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand gave dual monarchy excuse to attack Serbia); John
McLaughlin, Midday in the Garden of Evil and Evil, FORBES, Sept. 23, 1996, at S128, avail-
able in 1996 WL 15116043 (arguing that publicly displayed bust of Gavrilo Princip, Ser-
bian nationalist who assassinated Archduke Ferdinand thereby sparking WWI, shows
roots of Bosnian conflict); Jack Wood, Deep Roots and Far From a "Soft" Opinion- This
Area is Something of an Odd Man Out in Business Academia, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 3,
1993, at II (indirectly attributing 1993 death of Serbian boy to 1914 assassination of Arch-
duke Ferdinand).
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ity.5 4 Inevitably, in World War II, the Nazi takeover of the Yugo-
slavian Republics served as a stark foreshadowing of current
events-the "ethnic cleansing" of Serbs, Gypsies, and Jews.5 5 At
the close of WWII, Marshal Tito's communist partisans5 6 suc-
ceeded in consolidating Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slo-
venia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, into a shaky "Yugoslavian"
confederation. 7 This goal, however, was achieved at the costly
price of countless atrocities against Muslims and Croats as well as
an estimated 1.7 million death toll. 8 In no uncertain terms, these
singular events have served as the veritable backdrop for the cata-
54 See WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA, supra note 51, at 20 (describing local polit-
ical events in Europe directly leading to outbreak of World War I); see also JELAVICH, supra
note 53, at 296 (noting forced geopolitical co-existence of diverse peoples is shaky basis for
peace); Weisburd, supra note 49, at 2-9 (chronicling the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
showing breakdown of peoples in former Yugoslavia); cf Bergman, supra note 22, at 3 (not-
ing that wave of nationalism sweeping Balkan states probably superseded such practical
concerns as protection of individual human rights).
55 See Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, 72 FOREIGN AFF., Sum-
mer 1993, at 116-17 (detailing campaign of genocide unleashed on Bosnian civilians); see
also II HELSmKI WATCH, supra note 26, at 50, 63 (noting that few if any of architects of
ethnic cleansing have been brought to justice); Schmandt, supra note 51, at 377-78 (re-
marking that Bosnia-Herzegovina was scene of fierce battles between Serbs and Croats
during WWLI); Keeler, supra note 20, at 95 (discussing "ethnic cleansing" which has oc-
curred since demise of Soviet Union).
56 See JELAVICH, supra note 53, at 296 (relating how after WWII, attempting to heal
national strife, Marshall Tito organized Yugoslavia into six federal republics); see also Paul
Baskin, Bosnian Political Scene Heats Up as Muslim Slav-Croat Truce Holds, B.C. CYCLE,
Oct. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (discussing work of Croatian
Defense Council through months of heavy Serbian attacks on Jajce, town where Tito de-
clared founding of former Yugoslavia in 1941); Julian Coman, Myth of Manhood Takes
Course of Least Resistance, EUROPEAN, August 28, 1997, at 16 (recounting Marshall Tito's
communist partisan's laying claim to large areas northeast of Slovenia); Michael Dobbs,
Can We Make a Bosnian Miracle?; Only If We Recognize that Prosperity Is the Key to Peace,
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1995, at C01 (noting that task awaiting American peacekeeping
troops is comparable to that faced by Marshall Tito's communist partisans after WWII).
57 See JELAVICH, supra note 53, at 296 (considering ramifications of Tito's forced unifica-
tion initiative); Gordy, supra note 50, at 19 (arguing that Tito's multi-ethnic partisan force,
promising equality for all national groups, set up unified Yugoslavia); Sunic, supra note 49,
at A17 (noting that "[t]he principles of 'brotherhood and unity', which were subsequently
imposed by force on the Yugoslav constituent peoples by [Tito] could hardly mask profound
cultural differences among diverse Yugoslav ethnic groups"); see also Weisburd, supra note
49, at 2-9 (citing historical events which led to formation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). But see
Gordy, supra note 50, at 19 (discussing cooperative effort of members of former Yugoslavia
in forming "confederation").
58 See PETER W. GALBRAITH & MICHELLE MAYNARD, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF BOSNIA-
HERCEGOVINA 32 (Report prepared Staff of Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess., S. Prt. 102-103) (1993) (noting high cost of genocide incurred in forming
Yugoslavian polity has reaped resounding consequences in modern times); see also JE-
LAVICH, supra note 53, at 296 (citing events which have led to outbreak of hatred among
different ethnic and religious factions in former Yugoslavia); Schmandt, supra note 51, at
377-78 (recounting that modern day warfare in Bosnia-Herzegovina was virtually repeat
performance of same battles during WWII between Serbs and Croats occurring in same
geographical area).
492 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:477
clysmic eruption of fifty years of pent-up hatred through a relent-
less campaign of torture, murder, mass rape, and "ethnic
cleansing."59
B. Deconstructing the Yugoslavian Construct
The 1990 dissolution of the Yugoslavian polity, officially marked
by the multiparty elections held by the six republics,6 ° paved the
way for nearly six years of unrelenting warfare. 61 As a conse-
quence of the dissolution, civil war broke out in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina in the Summer of 1991.62 This was followed by ever-increas-
ing reports of atrocities being perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb
military.63 The apparent goal of the military was to carve out an
59 See Schmandt, supra note 51, at 337-38 (discussing that in countering Ustasa and
Nazi attacks against Serb nationalists, Cetniks committed atrocities against Muslims and
Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina which fostered much of ethnic hatred now evident in Bosnia-
Hercegovina); see also JELAVICH, supra note 53, at 296 (suggesting forced unification of
former Yugoslavia's diverse ethnicities in WWII was directly responsible for modern war
crimes and ethnic cleansing campaign); Into Bosnia, supra note 52, at 14 (noting that "in-
tensity of ethnic and religious rivalry has not diminished... "). But see WAR CRIMES IN
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA, supra note 51, at 20 (citing relative civil harmony in Balkans prior
to breakup of former Yugoslavia notwithstanding inter-ethnic diversity).
60 See Gideon A. Moor, The Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Article 51: Inherent
Rights and Unmet Responsibilities, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 870, 873-74 (1995) (recounting
collective disintegration of communist rule throughout all former Yugoslavian Republics
and universal efforts towards democratization through free elections); see also Cohen,
supra note 10, at 15A (describing eruption of ethnic and religious conflicts after collapse of
Communism); Lewis, supra note 10, at 1A (noting that genocidal atrocities were result of
intense nationalism after end of Cold War).
61 See Moor, supra note 60, 873-77 (recounting atrocities having taken place since disso-
lution of Yugoslavian polity); see also Schmandt, supra note 51, at 377-78 (discussing his-
tory of "ethnic cleansing" in Balkans and 1990 breakup of former Yugoslavian polity); Co-
hen, supra note 10, at 15A (citing actions citizens have taken to protect their families since
fighting began in Balkans); Lewis, supra note 10, at 1A (recounting American efforts to
enforce U.N. sanctions and feed starving Bosnians); cf Weisburd, supra note 49, at 2-9
(chronicling conflicts and atrocities occurring in Balkans over course of 1990 to 1995).
62 See Procida, supra note 12, at 671 (recounting outbreak of civil war in 1991 and how
Croats and Serbs sought their own nation-states); see also R.C. Longworth, Yugoslavia's
Outlook Darkens as Presidential Deadlock Persists, CHI. TRiB., May 18, 1991, at 4 (explain-
ing as consequence of war breaking out how one Croat lawyer was blocked from becoming
President); ef Celestine Bohlen, Yugoslavia Fails to Fill Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1991, at Al (citing inability to fill presidential post as major cause of fighting and crum-
bling of federal structure).
63 See Report of the International Tribunal, supra note 48 (reporting on the ICTY's lim-
ited success in prosecution of war crimes in former Yugoslavia); Anthony Lewis, Abroad, at
Home; Leadership and Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at A17 (discussing atrocities carried
out in name of ethnic purity); First Americans Arrive in Bosnia; Advance Survey Team
Laying the Groundwork for U.S. Peacekeepers, CHI. TIs., Nov. 30, 1995, at 8 (quoting Sec-
retary Boutros Boutros-Ghali regarding atrocities in Bosnia: "The full horror has yet to be
properly investigated and revealed"); cf Norman Kempster, Eagleburger Seeks Balkan
Atrocity Trials, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1992, at Al (comparing Yugoslavian ethnic horror to
Nazi war crimes); John Pomfret, "Cleansed" Town a Wasteland Now; Serbs Holding
Srebrenica, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis, World Library,
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"ethnically homogeneous" homeland by "cleansing" it of Muslims,
Croats, and all non-Serb peoples.64 In October of 1992, after more
than a year of engaging in ineffective scare tactics in light of well-
documented atrocities, the UN Security Council ("Council") finally
decided to act.65 Giving in to international pressure and to the
pleas of countless Bosnian victims themselves, the Council finally
convened a war crimes commission to "investigate" and "collect ev-
idence" of human rights violations to determine the extent of crim-
inal responsibility.6 6 It was not until February of 1993, however,
that the Council "officially" declared "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia
to be a "threat to international peace and security."67 Only at this
Allnews File (stating that after brutal "cleansing" of 40,000 Muslims, only 6,000 survived
in former enclave adjoining very site where those slaughtered were buried in mass graves).
64 See CROATIAN INFO. CENTER, supra note 26, at 107 (reporting Radovan Karadzic as
publicly proclaiming that only Serbians should populate his republic); II HELSINKi WATCH,
supra note 26, at 63 (asserting that Bosnian-Serb military forces were responsible for atroc-
ities of mass rape, torture, and summary executions of civilians in highly calculated cam-
paign to "ethnically cleanse" population of"non-Serbs"); Cohen, supra note 27, at A12 (re-
porting that Yugoslavian defector confirmed Bosnian Serbs officially carried out "ethnic
cleansing" as means to control armed forces and de facto government); see also Keeler,
supra note 20, at 95 (arguing that war crimes and ethnic cleansing were consequence of
ethnically-rooted nationalism); cf. Procida, supra note 12, at 670-74 (discussing role of U.N.
in preventing and punishing genocide in light of unrelenting Bosnian Serb campaign of
ethnic cleansing); Lewis, supra note 10, at 1A (reporting that U.S. President Bush was
asked by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic for military help to destroy Serbian weapons).
See generally HELsNiKu REPORT, 1992, supra note 42, at 67-68 (discussing human rights
violations committed by Serbian military forces).
65 Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report of Secretary-
General] (endorsing war crimes commission to "investigate" and "collect evidence" of al-
leged human rights violations in former Yugoslavia based on recommendation of U.N. Sec-
retary-General); see also Procida, supra note 12, at 673-75 (discussing U.N.'s imposition of
numerous "paper" and economic sanctions and employment of stall tactics before realizing
more aggressive tactics were necessary to stem bloodshed); cf S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR,
46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991), available in 31 I.L.M. 1427, 1431
(1992) (endorsing presence of peace-keeping force in former Yugoslavia for humanitarian
non-military purposes).
66 See Report of Secretary-General, supra note 65, at 4 (discussing events leading to long
overdue installation of"war crimes commission"); see also Procida, supra note 12, at 675-77
(relating U.N.'s long overdue attempts to begin to bring perpetrators of ethnic cleansing to
justice). See generally James Bone, U.S. Reveals Catalogue of Bosnian Atrocities, TIMEs
(London), Oct. 23 1992, available in 1992 WL 10909882 (discussing details of massacres,
rapes and torture to be investigated by new U.N. war crimes commission).
67 See U.N. CHARTER art. 39. In pertinent part, Article 39 provides that:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. [emphasis added]
Id.; Stanley Meisler, UN Approves Tribunal for Balkan War Crimes, CH. SUN-TIMES, Feb.
23, 1993, at 8. The U.N. officially established the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia ("ICTY") on February 22, 1993. Id.; see also Michael G. Karnavas, The Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal, 20-Dec. CHAMPION 20, 21 (1996). In its "ambitious undertaking"
establishing the ICTY, it is asserted that the Security Council dispensed with "normal pro-
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juncture did the Council finally resolve to establish a War Crimes
Tribunal.6" Meanwhile, as the UN carefully pondered its next
course of action, the Bosnian body count grew, and, unexpectedly,
yet another specter of genocide emerged, relentlessly tearing
asunder the African nation of Rwanda.6 9
C. Makeshift Solutions: The Joint War Crimes Tribunals
Suddenly faced with quickly mounting Rwandan atrocities as
well, the Council inevitably resolved to also institute an "in-
dependent" Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal ("ICTR").7 0 The Coun-
tocol" in the interests of more "urgently" addressing the grave human rights violations in
the former Yugoslavia. Id. at 20-21; Barbara M. Tocker, Intervention in the Yugoslav Civil
War: The United Nations' Right to Create an International Criminal Tribunal, 12 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 527, 547 (1994). Due to the ineffectiveness of "countless resolutions" imposing
"sanctions against the new Yugoslavia," as well as peaceful attempts at cease-fires, in view
of human rights violations there, the U.N. resolved to establish the ICTY. Id.
68 Security Council Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 23, U.N. Doc. SI
RES/808 (1993). On February 22, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 808, by
which it proposed to establish an International War Crimes Tribunal to prosecute those
"responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991." Id. See Karnavas, supra note 67, at 21. On
August 13, 1992, the Security Council expressed "grave alarm" at reports of human rights
violations. Id. Nonetheless, another nine months passed before the Tribunal was defini-
tively implemented via U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993. S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (993), available in 32 I.L.M.
1203, 1203-5 (1993); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 39. In order for the Security Council to
impose an embargo on a member state pursuant to article 39, it must determine the exist-
ence of a "threat to international peace and security." Id.
69 See U.N. to Investigate Killings in Rwanda, L.A. TiMEs, July 22, 1994, at 22, available
in 1994 WL 2181847 (adopting resolution ordering investigation of large scale tribal mas-
sacres in Rwanda based on U.N. human rights envoy's reports depicting planned and sys-
tematic acts of genocide); Wang, supra note 35, at 177 (arguing that April 6, 1994 plane
crash death of Rwanda's President directly led to killing of 500,000 Rwandans and mass
displacement of about six million others); Roger Winter, Journey into Genocide: A Rwanda
Diary, WASH. POST, June 5, 1994, at C01, available in 1994 WL 2290881 (describing first
hand eyewitness account of calculated slaughter of Rwandan civilians as "eerily reminis-
cent" of Nazi "Final Solution"); see also Akhavan, supra note 18, at 501 (characterizing
November 1994 establishment of International War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR")
as "yet another expression of reactive nature of international human rights system").
70 See Security Council Resolution 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) Establishing the International Tri-
bunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), Including the Annexed Statute of the Tribunal, S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3452d mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1598, 1601 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (declaring U.N.'s sole purpose in im-
plementing ICTR was to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda); Richard D. Lyons, U.N.
Approves Tribunal on Rwandan Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A12 (reporting Se-
curity Council vote to create ICTR to try those accused of atrocities in Rwanda despite
Rwandan delegate concerns that ICTR initiative lacked death penalty). But see Rwandan
Mayor Appeals for International Action on Genocide, P.R. NEWSWIRE, March 23, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File (arguing that ICTR established to prose-
cute perpetrators of Rwandan genocide will be ineffective until countries housing escaped
criminals act to apprehend criminals and bring them to justice); Akhavan, supra note 18, at
501 (criticizing U.N.'s delayed reaction to mounting Rwandan atrocities as providing or-
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cil soon acknowledged, however, that said Tribunal's coexistence
with the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
"dictated a similar legal approach [as the ICTRI" and maintaining
"certain organizational and institutional links" so that the "unity
of legal approach," and the "economy and efficiency of resources"
would be secured. 7 Mirroring this determination, Article 12(2) of
the Rwandan Statute further mandates that the ICTY's appeals
chamber membership "also serve as the member[ship] of the ap-
peals chamber of the [ICTR]."72 Additionally, Article 15(3) of
Rwandan Statute requires that the ICTY prosecutor simultane-
ously act as the ICTR prosecutor, although "[h]e or she shall have
additional staff... to assist with prosecutions before the [ICTR]."7
ganization with "ample opportunity, but little willingness, to take preventative action"
against worst genocide since WWII); Schiller, supra note 17, at 68 (questioning U.N.'s abil-
ity to punish genocide perpetrators without international criminal justice system); Tyagi,
supra note 16, at 906-07 (stating that inadequacies in international law prevent U.N. hu-
manitarian operations from leading to peace).
71 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Reso-
lution 955 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 3, para 9, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1995) (expres-
sing U.N.'s need, generally, to unify investigatory and prosecutorial efforts of ICTR with
those of ICTY in interests of expediency and justice); Id. at 2 (reaffirming that ICTR was
established to restore peace as well as to ensure cooperation of Rwanda and neighboring
states in apprehending perpetrators of genocide); see also Catherine Cisse, The Interna-
tional Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTMP. PROBS. 103, 108 (1997) (drawing from tragic lesson of pro-
tracted two-stage Resolution process to establish ICTY, in establishing ICTR, U.N. adopted
more expedient "one-Resolution" process). But see Rod Dixon, Developing International
Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81, 82 (1997) (proposing that problematic lack of"coherent set of international rules
of evidence" plaguing ICTY and ICTR Courts necessitates international evidentiary
scheme patterned after more common national systems of criminal law and procedure); Id.
at 82 (pointing out that ultimately reputations of ICTY and ICTR "will depend on how
evidence proving the guilt or innocence of the accused is presented and evaluated").
72 See ICTR Statute, supra note 70, at 1606. Specifically, Article 12(2) the ICTR Statute
sets forth:
The members of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [ICTY] .. .shall also serve as the
members of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.
Id. at 1606; see also id. art. 1. Article 1 provides: "The International Tribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the
provisions of the present Statute." Id.; cf id. art. 13(2). The elected judges of both the ICTY
and the ICTR meet in the Hague. Id.
73 Id. at 1608 (noting dual prosecutorial role required under ICTY/ICTR Statutes). See
Schabas, supra note 34, at 481 (pointing out problem that as ICTY and ICTR jurisdiction
are geographically determined, likelihood that each Court will impose "a different sentence
on individuals merely because of the place where the crime was committed is difficult to
reconcile with the notion of equality before the law"); Wang, supra note 35, at 198 (noting
formidable difficulties in investigation of crimes in former Yugoslavia as sole prosecutor
with handful of assistants impeded by limited finances and inaccessibility to crime areas,
victims and forensic evidence); cf Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav Crimes Tribunal: A Prose-
cutor's View, 6 DuKE J. CoMP. & IN'L L. 187, 189 (1995) (relating observation that "the
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While the genocide proscriptions in both Statutes effectively track
the same language under the Genocide Convention,74 there are
nonetheless important distinctions between the ICTR and the
ICTY Statutes concerning the pivotal question of subject matter
jurisdiction.
In the first instance, the ICTR Statute, unlike the ICTY Statute,
eliminates the Article 3 prerequisite of "armed conflict" in deter-
mining what constitutes "crimes against humanity."75  This
notwithstanding, the ICTR Statute does prescribe a causal nexus
between inhumane acts committed on a discriminatory basis.76
manner in which the Tribunal was organized, with the judges appointed more than a year
before the Prosecutor, [was] like trying to build a house from the roof down").
74 See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 70, at 1602-03. Article 2 of the Statute provides:
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of
the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of
the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its phys-
ical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit geno-
cide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit geno-
cide; (e) Complicity in genocide.
Id. at 1602-03; see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Decem-
ber 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force on January 12, 1951 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]. Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention respectively provide that:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part; .... The following acts
shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and
public incitement to commit genocide...
Id. arts. II and III.
75 See ICTR Statute, supra note 70, at 1603. Article 3 of the ICTR
Statute provides:
Crimes Against Humanity. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as
part of a widespread attack against any civilian population on national, political, eth-
nic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d)
Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecution on political, racial
and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts.
Id. art. 3; see also Dorinda Lea Peacock, "It Happened and It Can Happen Again" The
International Response to Genocide in Rwanda, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 899, 901
(1997). While the Genocide Convention was drawn as a direct reaction to the Nazi atroci-
ties of WWII, the U.N.'s belabored response, pursuant to the Convention, to the recent
resurgence of genocide reduces the impassioned post-Holocaust avowal of "never again" to a
hollow plea. Id.
76 See ICTR Statute, supra note 70, at 1603. In pertinent part, Article 3 of the ICTR
Statute provides: 1. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group .... [emphasis
added]. Id. art. 3; see also Akhavan, supra note 18, at 501 n.14. While the ICTR Statute,
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Most noteworthy, though, is that the ICTR's subject matter juris-
diction encompasses proscriptions unique to the ICTR Statute's
Article 4 and those found in both the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the 1977 Protocol II.7 7 Nevertheless, the "grave breaches" lan-
guage under the Geneva Conventions were of no moment in view
of the fact that the Rwandan atrocities by definition constituted
an "internal" as opposed to an "international" conflict. 78 Not sur-
unlike Article 5 of its ICTY counterpart, expressly requires ethno-racially or religiously
motivated inhumane acts, in contrast, article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, after which
the ICTR and ICTY were modeled, does not make "the existence of discriminatory grounds"
a precondition to "crimes against humanity." Id. But see Sapru, supra note 32, at 343-44. In
the case of Rwanda, "the Genocide Convention as well as Resolution 955 [would] require a
showing that the Hutu intended to kill the Tutsi because they were Tutsi." Id. at 343 [em-
phasis added]. The legal problem is that since the murderers, at least in theory, could claim
to not have been able to identify the "victims as Tutsi [when] they were killing them, the
Genocide Convention cannot be used to prosecute the atrocities in Rwanda." Id. at 343-44.
77 See ICTR Statute, supra note 70, at 1604. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute provides:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons com-
mitting or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Addi-
tional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not
be limited to:
(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular




(d) Acts of terrorism;
(e) Outrage upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,
rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(f) Pillage;
(g) The passage of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judg-
ment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;
(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Id. art. 4; see also Von Sternberg, supra note 33, at 111. In contrast to the ICTR, then, the
jurisdiction of the ICTY was predicated on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Id.; cf. Roberts,
supra note 46, at 65. Because many of the Rwandan international human rights violations
also violate its local law, and since the ICTR was established at Rwanda's request, it sug-
gests a "desire to bring massive human rights violations . . . in internal armed conflicts,
within the ambit of international rules." Id.
78 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, at 73, para. 141 (1995), reprinted in
35 I.L.M. 32, 72. In Tadic, the appellate chamber of the ICTY unanimously held:
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity
do not require a connection to international armed conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor
points out, customary international law may not require a connection between crimes
against humanity be committed in either internal or international armed conflict, the
Security Council may have defined the crime in Article 5 [of the ICTY Statute] more
narrowly than necessary under customary international law.
Id.; see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 Am. J.
INT'L L. 554, 559 (1995). As the ICTR makes "no allusion to the international or non-inter-
national character of the conflict," the broad "crimes against humanity" language of Article
3 of the ICTR "enhances the possibility of arguing that crimes against humanity... can be
committed even in peacetime." Id. Moreover, "[tihe tangled meshing of crimes against hu-
manity and human rights violations in Rwanda militates against requiring that the former
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prisingly, then, the UN Secretary General, reporting on the ICTR
Statute, observed that "[the Council] elected to take a more expan-
sive approach to .. .the applicable law than the one underlying
the statute of the [ICTYI." 79 In the final analysis, however
landmark in their breadth, not only was the promulgation of the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes painfully slow, but these effectively
served as little more than topical antiseptics in the treatment of
the malignancy of genocide.
be linked with war." Id. at 557; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31, available in 1950 WL 7476 (TIA) [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. In pertinent part,
the Convention sets forth:
ARTICLE 13
The present Convention shall apply to the wounded and sick belonging to the following
categories:
(1) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements ...
ARTICLE 14
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the wounded and sick of a belligerent who fall
into enemy hands shall be prisoners of war, and the provisions of international law
concerning prisoners of war shall apply to them.
ARTICLE 15
At all times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties to a conflict shall, without
delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick, to
protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to
search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
Id. arts. 13, 14, 15, at 3-4. Article 3 further provides that: "In case of armed conflict not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to" abide a minimum set of criteria for the care of
the injured and sick. Id. art. 3, at 1.
79 See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Reso-
lution 955, supra note 71, at 3. In view of the pressing need to take a more expansive
approach via the ICTR, the Security Council requested "the Secretary-General to imple-
ment this resolution urgently and in particular to make practical arrangements for the
effective functioning of the [ICTR], including recommendations to the Council as to possible
locations for the seat of the International Tribunal at the earliest time . . ." ICTR Statute,
supra note 70, at para. 5. Subsequently, the Secretary-General also noted that the estab-
lishment of the ICTR served the dual purpose of restoring peace in the region of Rwanda
and, importantly, in ensuring cooperation among Rwanda and neighboring nations in locat-
ing suspected war criminals. Id.; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 5
of Security Council Resolution 955, supra note 71, at 2. From the very outset, Rwanda's
own government, unlike the parties to the Balkan conflict, had in fact requested U.N. in-
tervention through the installation of a War Crimes Tribunal. Id.; Cisse, supra note 71, at
107. Moreover, in light of the perceived ineffectiveness of the ICTY, the U.N. Secretary-
General urged the Security Council take measures to "ensure that the individuals responsi-
ble [for Rwandan atrocities would be] . . .brought to justice before an independent and
impartial international criminal tribunal." U.N. Security Council, Letter Dated, 1 October
1994, from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, at
148, U.N. Doc. S/199411125 (1994).
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D. The U.N.'s Inaction and Subsequent Embargo Denied
Bosnia the Right to Self-Defense and Escalated
Instances of Genocide
Throughout the Security Council's protracted process of deliber-
ation and indecision regarding the institution of the ICTY (and
the ICTR), flagrant acts of genocide and human rights violations
escalated unchecked in Bosnia and Rwanda. 0 More important,
the situation of mounting atrocities was further aggravated by the
Council's 1991 imposition of an arms embargo on Bosnia.8' This
embargo effectively barred any outside importation of arms to as-
sist in the Bosnian war effort."2 The embargo, however, was in
direct contravention of Bosnia's recognized UN member status
pursuant to its declaration of sovereignty in 1990.83 Ironically,
80 See U.N. Secretary-General, Eighth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, 49th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/1994/967 (1994) (report-
ing on ongoing commission of ethnic cleansing in areas under control of Bosnian Serb
forces); Sixth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 8 [herein-
after Sixth Periodic Report] (relating international observers' accounts of detention camps
characterizing conditions therein as "very bad" where prisoners suffered from cold, hunger,
abuse, and lack of basic necessities); see also Peacock, supra note 75, at 901 (discussing
implications of U.N.'s belabored response to Rwandan instances of genocide of Holocaust-
like proportions).
81 See S.C. Res. 713, supra note 65, at paras. 3-6. Adopted on September 25, 1991, in
pertinent part, Resolution 713 mandates "under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, that all States shall for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugo-
slavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weap-
ons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise fol-
lowing consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia." Id.
at para. 6; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 51 which prohibits the U.N. from impeding a member
nation to act in self-defense; Procida, supra note 12, at 673-75. The U.N.'s imposition of
"paper" sanctions served as stall tactics prolonging the inevitable necessity for military
action. Id.
82 See S.C. Res. 713, supra note 65, at para. 6 (commanding that all U.N. members re-
frain from continuing to import weapons into war-torn former Yugoslavia); see also Aaron
K Baltes, Prosecutor v. Tadic: Legitimizing the Establishment of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 49 ME. L. REV. 577, 580 (1997) (outlining history
leading up to 1991 U.N. arms embargo). But see David Wippman, Defending Democracy
Through Foreign Intervention, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 659, 668 (1997) (explaining that despite
1991 embargo U.N. did in fact authorize aid, but that aid was to Bosnian Serbs, not to
Bosnian government).
83 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 recognizes the inherent right of all U.N. member
nations to engage in acts of self-preservation and self-defense, presumptively unencum-
bered by any U.N. measure, resolution or Charter provision. Id.; David Wippman, Change
and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in International Conflict, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 435, 453 (1996). The Bosnian government was reported to have
argued that the 1991 U.N. arms embargo violated Bosnia's inherent right to receive aid.
Id.; see also Philip J. Cohen, M.D., Ending the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugosla-
via, 6 PACE IN'L L. REV. 19, 21-22 (1994). Dr. Cohen argues that:
The UN's recognition of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, coupled with the continua-
tion of an arms embargo on these states, has proven an incompetent exercise of author-
ity. The net effect has been to encourage one-sided Serbian aggression by obstructing
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this "declaration" entitled Bosnia to the "right to self-defense" as
provided for under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 4 particularly in
view of the incontrovertible reports of international war crimes."5
Unfortunately, the end result was that not only did the Council
fail to actively defend Bosnia, but, in violation of Article 51, by
way of a UN-imposed arms embargo restriction, the Council effec-
tively prevented Bosnia from defending itself."6 Perhaps most im-
portant, in the final analysis, the embargo was an inexpedient and
the self-defense of Muslims and Croats, even as they are victims of genocide. Since
September 1991, the U.S., E.C., and later the U.N., have interfered in the Balkans by
imposing an arms embargo that extended to the victims of genocide but have not inter-
vened on the victims' behalf. With no serious help ever offered to stop Serbian aggres-
sion, a power vacuum has been created in the Balkans, with the opportunity for terror-
ist states to extend their influence in the region.
Id.; U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 49. Read in tandem, these articles clearly support the conclu-
sion that as the U.N. sanction of an arms embargo was imposed under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, it was therefore binding on all U.N. member states, including the U.S., E.C.
and all parties to the Balkan conflict. Id.
84 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (providing in second clause that member state has right to
exercise self-defense "until the Security Council takes the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." Id.; Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90
Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1996) (arguing that Security Council's arms embargo violated Bosnia's
Article 51 right to defend itself against genocide in view of Council's failure to implement
countermeasures on behalf of Bosnia to reinstate peace and security in Balkans); Ibrahim
J. Gassama, World Order in the Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United
Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 255, 330 n.73 (1994) (observing that as
'situation in Bosnia continu[ed] to deteriorate ... there [had] been calls from .. .U.S.
Congress for U.S. to ignore a UN arms embargo and supply arms to Bosnian Muslims");
Michael P. Scharf and Joshua L. Dorosin, Interpreting UN Sanctions: The Rulings and Role
of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 771, 775 (1993) (requesting
that ICJ enjoin embargo, Bosnian government argued that relevant U.N. "resolutions must
be construed to allow states to provide Bosnia-Herzegovina with military [aid]" pursuant to
its Article 51 right to self-defense); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 773 (citing U.N. interest
in maintaining international peace which led to arms embargo); cf Bourloyannis, supra
note 5, at 335-44 (relating international humanitarian law since 1949 to Balkans crisis).
85 See Sixth Periodic Report, supra note 80, at 8 (relating vivid third party accounts of
inhumane health and living conditions of Bosnian detention camp prisoners); see also
Moor, supra note 60, at 903 (noting that U.N. Special Rapporteur, via Sixth Periodic Re-
port, was especially critical of U.N.'s marked inefficacy in taking appropriate measures to
curtail mounting Balkan atrocities); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 1st Special Sess.,
Agenda Item 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/S-1/9 (1992) [hereinafter First Report] (con-
cluding that "[mlassive and grave violations of human rights [were] occurring throughout
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina"). But see Moor, supra note 60, at 873 (recognizing
that as "arms embargo terminated Bosnia's Article 51 right to exercise self-defense, the
United Nations took measures intended to maintain international peace and security").
86 See Roger Cohen, Serbs Close in on Bosnian Town; U.N. and NATO Unable to Act,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al (criticizing imposition of arms embargo on Bosnia which
prevented necessary aid to Bosnia in abrogation of its right to self-defense under Article
51); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (providing that nothing in U.N. "Charter shall impair
the inherent right of ... self-defense" where Member nation is attacked); U.N. Admits
Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia, L.A. TiMEs, May 23, 1992, at A6 (reporting that in his ad-
dress to U.N. General Assembly, Bosnian Foreign Minister, Haris Silajdzic hopelessly
pleaded: "We call on this body to come to our aid in the hour of our greatest need"). See
generally Elaine Sciolino, Bosnian Asks GOP Lawmakers to Help End Arms Embargo, N.Y.
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improvident exercise of UN authority bespeaking of the entity's
relative ineffectiveness.87 In actuality, instead of an anticipated
cease-fire, the embargo hastened the opposite result of escalating
atrocities against an already defenseless Bosnia. 8
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter guarantees member states a right
to defend themselves.8 9 That right cannot be terminated or
abridged until the Security Council has taken affirmative steps to
protect a member state from military aggression.90 The Council's
failure to expedite the restoration of peace and security in Bosnia
violated Article 51's criteria for terminating a state's right to self-
defense. 9' And despite Bosnia finally being allowed to exercise its
ThMEs, Jan. 31, 1995, at A3 (noting that Bosnian Prime Minister lobbied Congress to lift
arms embargo on Bosnia if U.N. was unable to get Bosnian Serbs to agree to peace plan).
87 See M. Jennifer MacKay, Economic Sanctions: Are They Actually Enforcing Interna-
tional Law in Serbia-Montenegro, 3 Tm.L. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 223 (1994) (noting that
insofar as centrally situated European countries like Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro were
formerly related, it was "difficult to isolate Serbia commercially and to enforce embargoes,
without also cutting off Bosnia"); see also Ziyad Motala and David T. Butle Ritchie, Self-
Defense in International Law, The United Nations, and the Bosnian Conflict, 57 U. PITT. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1995) (asserting that U.N. "Resolution 713 arguably prevented the legitimate
government of Bosnia-Herzegovina from procuring arms from the international community
and effectively defending its territorial integrity.. ."). But see Craig Scott et al., A Memorial
for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance
of the United Nations Security Council's Arm Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 59-60 (1994) (arguing contrarily that embargo "[did not fetter Bosnia's
inherent right to self-defense under Article 51...").
88 See William Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: The Karadzic Litiga-
tion and the Yugoslav Conflict, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 143 (1996) (reporting that by
availing themselves of U.N.-imposed embargo and '[alided by Serbian government, the
Bosnian Serbs soon gained control over many disputed areas"); Amy Lou King, Bosnia-
Herzegovina: Vance-Owen Agenda for a Peaceful Settlement: Did the U.N. Do Too Little,
Too Late, to Support this Endeavor?, 23 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 347, 368 (1993) (arguing
that reliance on "sanctions against Serbia [did] not stop the war," but merely served as
"readily convenient response" enabling "UN and international community to forestall di-
rect involvement"); see also Scharf and Dorosin, supra note 84, at 775 (explaining effect of
Security Council's Resolutions on embargo); cf Laurie A. Cohen, Application of the Realist
and Liberal Perspectives to the Implementation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nu-
remberg and Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 113, 146 (1997) (noting that
"[ciontinued escalating violence led UN to attempt economic sanctions, humanitarian relief
operations, and political negotiations").
89 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (recognizing inherent right of self-defense of U.N. member
nations); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, preamble (exhorting that principle of non-interven-
tion under Article 2, Paragraph 7 apply to all U.N. bodies); cf U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3
(promoting international cooperation and encouraging respect for human rights).
90 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 specifically provides: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Id.; S.C.
Res. 713, supra note 65, at paras. 1-6. The U.N. urged feuding factions in Yugoslavia to
settle disputes through negotiations in view of the escalating conffict which posed a threat
to international peace and security. Id.
91 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (acknowledging U.N. member states' right of self-preserva-
tion); see also S.C. Res. 713, supra note 65 (declaring that all deliveries of weapons shall be
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Article 51 right to self-defense by the Security Council's delayed
retraction of its arms embargo in late 1995, the inestimable in-
stances of rape, torture and genocide can never again be
vindicated.9 2
E. The UN's Failure to Enforce Indictments of War Criminals
Through the Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal
Compromised its International Authority and
Credibility
Whereas the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was
established according to treaty,93 the War Crimes Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia was instead created in 1992 upon the recom-
mendation of the Secretary General and through Security Council
Resolution 827.94 The Secretary's establishment of the War
Crimes Tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was in-
tended to give the Security Council "broad responsibility" for
suspended although failing to implement any military action to stop violations); cf
Bourloyannis, supra note 5, at 335 (noting U.N.'s most important objective of maintaining
international peace and security undermined fundamental principle of non-use of force).
92 See Security Council Resolution Terminating Embargo on Deliveries of Weapons and
Military Equipment to Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 1021, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3595th
mtg., at 1-2, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1021 (1995) (retracting arms embargo implemented
under prior S.C. Resolution 713); see also U.N. CIARTER art. 51 (prohibiting U.N. from
impeding member nations to act in own self-defense); Security Council Resolution 713,
supra note 65 (setting forth resolution first establishing controversial Bosnian arms
embargo).
93 See Hague Convention (No. V) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention (No. IV)] (noting that "Nuremberg
... Tribunal specifically recognized 1907 pact as declaratory of customary international
law and thus binding on all nations, regardless of their [UN] signatory status"); Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, 1 I.M.T. 173, 174-75 [hereinafter Military Tri-
bunal Charter] (defining jurisdiction and functions of IMT and crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity for which Nazis were indicted); see also Lara Lieb-
man, From Nuremberg to Bosnia: Consistent Application of International Law, 42 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 705, 705 (1994) (discussing effect of ad hoc Tribunal in 1945-46 on fundamental
moral principles of international human rights law).
94 See Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 1, adopted as per S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
SCOR, para. 2, Doc. S/25626 (1993), available in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170 (formally establish-
ing "competence" of ICTY and setting forth specific scope of its subject matter jurisdiction);
see also Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanita-
rian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993), available in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1164 [hereinafter Secretary-General ICTY Report] (rec-
ognizing obligation of Secretary-General pursuant to U.N. Resolution 808 to propose op-
tions "for the effective and expeditious implementation of the decision to establish [ICTY]");
see also U.N. CHARTER Chap. VII (granting Security Council wide powers to implement
measures to restore and maintain international peace and security); cf Liebman, supra
note 93, at 706 (noting establishment of War Crimes Tribunal).
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maintaining and "restoring international peace and security".9 5
This noble goal of renewed peace, however, has yet to material-
ize.96 Hence, in view of the foregoing, the first problem impeding
the effectiveness of the War Crimes Tribunal is one of "jurisdic-
tional" limitation.9
7
The Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction encompasses infrac-
tions under the 1949 Geneva Convention, including violations of
the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against human-
ity.98 All of these offenses are proscribed both by the rules of "cus-
tomary international humanitarian law" and the nullum crimen
sine lege doctrine,99 and are binding on all nations, regardless of
UN membership. The catch-22 is that the promulgation of the
ICTY as a reaction to war crimes committed within the territory of
95 See Secretary-General ICTY Report, supra note 94, at para. 2 (presenting report of
proposals to Security Council for implementation of ICTY as mandated by UN Resolution
808); S.C. Res. 827, supra note 94, at para. 2 (reaffirming decision via UN Resolution 808
that an international tribunal be established for prosecution of persons responsible for seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law); see also U.N. CHARTER Chapter VII (im-
parting to Security Council broad powers to carry out function of maintaining and restoring
international peace and security). See generally Karl A. Hochkammer, Yugoslav War
Crimes Tribunal: The Compatibility of Peace, Politics and International Law, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 148-49 (1995) (discussing actions leading up to adoption of Resolution
827).
96 See Roy Gutman, War Crimes Unit Hasn't a Clue, U.N. Setup Seems Designed to Fail,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar. 4, 1993, at 8 (stating that tribunal has been ineffective due to lack of
staff and inability to follow "hot trails"); see also Hochkammer, supra note 95, at 148-49
(stating how Tribunal's hasty construction and complicated rules in negotiating peace set-
tlements may prevent prosecution of war criminals). But see Mark A. Bland, An Analysis of
United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes in the Former Yugosla-
via, Parallels, Problems, Prospects, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 233, 245 (1994) (citing
reasons why Nuremberg Tribunal arrangement does not serve as precedent in interna-
tional law); Bonnie Santosus, An International Criminal Court: 'Where Global Harmony
Begins", 5 Touo INT'L L. REV. 25, 36 (1994) (noting that certain countries like U.S. favor
jurisdictional limitations on an ICC which has led to inability of U.N. to formulate ICC to
prosecute human rights offenders).
97 See Bland, supra note 96, at 245 (discussing War Crimes Tribunal's jurisdictional
problem of not being able to grant binding judgments); see also Hochkammer, supra note
95, at 151-52 (noting that Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction is limited by time and loca-
tion); Santosus, supra note 96, at 36 (recognizing concerns over potential jurisdictional
problems).
98 See Bland, supra note 96, at 247 (discussing limited jurisdictional bases from Geneva
Convention); see also Hague Convention (No. IV), supra note 93, at 2277 (citing nations
who are members of convention and parties to treaty); Military Tribunal Charter, supra
note 93, at art. 6 (describing specific nature of Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction).
99 See Roger S. Clark and Madeleine Sann, Coping with Ultimate Evil Through the
Criminal Law, 7 CRIM. L.F. 1, 8 (1996) (noting that Article 3 of War Crimes Tribunal Stat-
ute does not violate principle of nullum crimen sine lege, which doctrine provides no crime
is chargeable absent an applicable law); see also Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives:
Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L.
57, 79-81 (1995) (discussing history of nullum crimen sine lege defense); Liebman, supra
note 93, at 728 (citing probability that Yugoslavian conflict participants will likely rely on
nullum crimen sine lege defense).
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the former Yugoslavia confined the ICTY's territorial jurisdiction
and enforcement powers strictly within the fictional boundaries of
that former Republic. 100 This suggests a second problem: the ab-
sence of an effective means of enforcing convictions-the void cre-
ated by the ICTY's severely circumscribed jurisdiction.
By April of 1997, of the seventy-five individuals indicted by the
War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia only seven were
in custody, none of whom had yet been convicted. 1° 1 Most notable
among the seventy-five indictments were the joint arrest warrants
issued against Bosnian Serb President, Radovan Karadzic, and
Bosnian Serb military leader, Ratko Mladic. 10 2 To date, while nu-
merous federal claims have been brought against them in the
United States under the Aliens Tort Act,10 3 neither Karadzic nor
Mladic, has been apprehended or brought to justice under the au-
thority of the War Crimes Tribunal. 10 4 As a consequence, the Tri-
100 See Hochkammer, supra note 95, at 151 (noting how Tribunal's jurisdiction was lim-
ited to violations occurring only within certain territorial boundaries); see also Hague Con-
vention (No. IV), supra note 93, at 2277 (establishing supra-territorial principle of custom-
ary international law as binding on all nations); Military Tribunal Charter, supra note 93,
at 174-75 (defining jurisdiction of IMT in trying instances of genocide and Nazi war crimes
as restricted to members of Axis Power countries); cf General Framework Agreement for
Peace, Nov. 21, 1995, art. 9 (mandating cooperation with all entities authorized by Security
Council "pursuant to the obligation of all parties to cooperate in the investigation and pros-
ecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law").
101 See Morris B. Abram, Will War Criminals Escape Justice?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1997,
at A18, available in 1997 VL-WSJ 2415146 (warning that hands-off NATO policy of refus-
ing to arrest indicted war criminals stymied efforts of ICTY insofar as of April 1, 1997
'loinly seven of the 75 war criminals indicted [were] in custody, not one of them arrested by
NATO troops"); Gutman, supra note 96, at 8 (discussing rumors of "persons" in U.N. panel
intentionally not pursuing convictions of Serbian Leaders); see also Clark & Sann, supra
note 99, at 5 (stating that as of June 1996 over 75 indictments were handed down); Id. at 6
(noting that while several arrest warrants had been executed, leaders Karadzic and Mladic
were still at large).
102 See Bernard Meltzer, 'War Crimes: The Nuremberg Trial and the Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 895, 908 (1996) (reporting that as promoters of
ethnic cleansing, Karadzic and Mladic have been indicted); see also Clark & Sann, supra
note 99, at 5 (noting that Karadzic and Mladic, two most reprehensible violators, were still
at large despite their primary responsibility for masterminding policies which led to mas-
sive human rights violations); cf David P. Kunstle, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individu-
als Have Enforceable Rights and Obligations Under the Aliens Torts Claims Act?, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 319, 319 (1996) (discussing Karadzic's court cases and crimes charged
therewith).
103 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (originally enacted as Alien Tort Claims Act, June 25,
1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 934) (providing that "[federal] district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States"); Torture Victim Protection Act of Mar. 12, 1992,
Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, § 2(a)(1) (providing that "individual who, under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to
torture, in a civil action [will] be liable to that individual").
104 See Meltzer, supra note 102, at 909-10 (noting that despite Karadzic and Mladic hav-
ing been indicted by ICTY, neither had been arrested and that both remained in power);
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bunal, in abrogation of its very mandate, has compromised the
UN's authority and thwarted international justice by failing to
compel the enforcement of indictments against the key architects
of Bosnian war crimes and genocide.
Based on most international legal standards, the Tribunal's is-
suance of an arrest warrant constitutes a request for extradition,
subject to refusal only upon a showing that the warrant gravely
contravenes local law.- 5 Viewed in this light, the recent position
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"), for example, to not
surrender its citizens because its constitution forbids the extradi-
tion of nationals, is a legally insufficient basis for failing to obey
the Tribunal's juridical orders. 106 The fact of the matter is that,
barring some serious legal impediment, requests for the surrender
of persons indicted by the Tribunal are binding under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter and take precedence over a member nation's
local authority. 107 Nevertheless, the Security Council, in clear ab-
see also Clark & Sann, supra note 99, at 5 (discussing large number of indicted war
criminals still at large); Kunstle, supra note 102, at 319 (noting U.S. federal court jurisdic-
tion over claims against Karadzic).
105 See Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes
Tribunal, 18 Fall FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77, 78 (1994) (discussing obstacle of conflict
between international and domestic laws); Caroline D. Krass, Bringing the Perpetrators of
Rape in the Balkans to Justice: Time for an International Criminal Court, 22 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 317, 322-34 (1994) (describing how court system in Bosnia differs from other
States' court systems including that of U.S.). See generally U.N. CHARTER Chapter VII (set-
ting forth international obligations concerning peace and security); Supplementary Con-
vention on Extradition, March 14, 1983, Sweden-U.S., Treaty Doc. No. 98-4, 98th CONG. 1st
SEss. (1983) (providing example of U.S. policy to extradite foreign nationals).
106 See O'Shea, supra note 36, at 386. Ironically, the "Yugoslavian government main-
tain[ed] that the [ICTY] is 'contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which prohibits extradition of Yugoslav nationals.'" Id. at 386.
(quoting Letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General (May 17, 1993), U.N. Doc. A/48/
170, S/25801, at 3 (1993) [hereinafter Letter dated 17 May 1993]. In this regard, the Dep-
uty Prime Minister specifically asserted that "the Security Council [had] no mandate to
establish an international tribunal, nor does Chapter VII of the [UN] Charter provide for
the establishment of the [ICTY]." Id. O'Shea, supra, at 386. In a similar light, "the United
States has signed an executive agreement with the [ICTY] not merely to implement Resolu-
tion 827, but because no authority exists under U.S. law to extradite without an express
legislative or treaty stipulation." Id.; see also Blakesley, supra note 105, at 104. The author
relates the issue of limiting jurisdiction under the International Tribunal. Id.; Bland, supra
note 96, at 273. The author recounts the extradition of Serbian war criminals and the laws
different countries are enacting to facilitate such extradition. Id.
107 See G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/
8429 (1971) (affirming that states' refusal "to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and
punishment" of persons accused or convicted of war crimes against humanity is "contrary
to the U.N. Charter and to generally recognized norms of international law"); see also
Krass, supra note 105, at 350 (discussing that even if powerful officials are not prosecuted,
actual rapists could be); Robert Kushen and Kenneth J. Harris, Surrender of Fugitives by
the United States to the War Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 90 AM. J. INT'L
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rogation of Chapter VII, has somehow allowed the Tribunal to
concede its superior authority in this matter by kowtowing to local
pressure and failing to enforce arrest warrants.1 0 8 This has re-
sulted in criminal indictments for genocide effectively going ig-
nored and international justice being trounced in the process. 10 9
F. Promises Broken: The Ill-fated Dayton Peace Initiative
This, in turn, leads us to a third problem: The Tribunal's deci-
sion not to actively seek to implement the enforcement of its in-
dictments not only contradicted its very mission, but also contra-
vened the 1995 Dayton peace initiative.1"' Under the Dayton
L. 510, 511 (1996) (explaining obligation of states to cooperate with Tribunals as imposed
by U.N. Charter and Security Council Resolutions).
108 See U.N. CHARTER Chapter VII (granting UN Security Council broad enforcement
powers in maintaining international security); Clark & Sann, supra note 99, at 6 (noting
that despite Tribunal's execution of arrest warrants, Karadzic and Mladic went unap-
prehended); Gutman, supra note 96, at 8 (explaining ineffective authority of ICTY); see
also Blakesley, supra note 105, at 91 (noting domestic versus international law conflict);
Bruno Milinkovic, Yugoslavia: Mixed Reaction to War Crimes Tribunal Visit, INTER. PRESS
SERVICE, Oct. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (explaining war
crime suspects not extradited by home country will be subject to international indictment
backed by Interpol). But see Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of Humani-
tarian Law: Reflections on the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J.
COMP. & INTL L. 79, 101 (1995) (discussing obstacles to Tribunal having orders enforced
effectively, such as lack of financial support).
109 See Simon Chesterman, Never Again ... And Again: Law, Order and the Gender of
War Crimes and Beyond, 22 YALE J. INTL L. 299, 316 (1997) (warning by ICTY Chief Prose-
cutor Arbour that unless ICTY is given assistance in bringing indicted war criminals to
trial, "its perceived failure may exacerbate the tensions that it was designed to appease");
Amy E. Ray, The Shame of it: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the
Failure of the International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 Am. U. L.
REV. 793, 840 n.30 (1997) (noting that ICTY Statute makes "no provisions for obtaining
custody of the accused, [and that] such cooperation is crucial if many of those indicted for
war crimes are ever to be brought to justice"); see also International Tribunal for the Prose-
cution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rule 61, UN Doc. IT/32 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 484 [hereinafter Tribunal
Rules] (declaring that where reasonable service of indictment is not practical, indictment
shall be submitted to ICTY trial chamber, and upon determination of indictment's "reason-
ableness," trial chamber shall issue international arrest warrant through Interpol).
110 See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, December
14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter Framework Agreement] (implementing
workable plan after Dayton Agreement providing for peaceful coexistence of Muslim, Serb,
and Croat peoples and end of ethno-religious hostilities); Peace Implementation Conference
for the Bosnian General Framework Agreement: Conclusions of the London Meeting, De-
cember 12, 1995, 35 I.L.M 223, 225 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter Peace Conference] (summariz-
ing desired achievements and long-term goals as result of brokered peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina); Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, November 10, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170, 172 (Jan. 1996) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement]
(recognizing establishment of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as prerequisite to
peace in region); see also Robin Knight, Can There Be Justice as Well as Peace in Bosnia?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1995, at 30 (reporting that Milosevic agreed at Dayton
Peace talks to cooperate fully with U.N. War Crimes Tribunal).
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Agreement, the heads of the FRY, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzego-
vina agreed to cooperate with and be bound by the mandates of
the War Crimes Tribunal.111 It is undisputed that these states
freely agreed to subject themselves to the authority of the War
Crimes Tribunal." 2 The inevitable question then becomes: Why
has the Tribunal not taken the FRY, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herze-
govina to task by aggressively pursuing the enforcement of its
arrest warrants within their borders? One view is that the Tribu-
nal has been handcuffed by the "paper tiger" constraints of its own
doctrine and unwarranted subordination to dubious local wartime
authorities.'1 3 A more incisive perspective to this dilemma, how-
"' See Framework Agreement, supra note 110, at 75 (instating plan to end hostilities
among former Yugoslavian republics); Peace Conference, supra note 110, at 223 (recon-
ciling peaceful goals of previously warring factions to end of fostering stability and security
in Balkans); Dayton Agreement, supra note 110, at 172 (recognizing establishment of Fed-
eration between Bosnia and Herzegovina as prerequisite to peace in respective Republics);
see also John Pomfret, The Dayton Hurrahs v. Bosnian Reality: Can Serbian Leader Deliver
Peace?, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1995, at A35 (emphasizing importance of Milosevic carrying
out promise of compliance with plan and replacement of Karadzic and Miadic).
112 See Dayton Agreement, supra note 110, at 172 (declaring that signatories freely
'agreed to radical steps to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the Fed-
eration"); see also O'Shea, supra note 106, at 376 (stating that "as required by Resolution
827, all domestic legislation enables countries to cooperate with the [ICTY]" and to "trans-
fer suspects" over to Hague). But see Dusan Cotic, A Critical Study of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 223, 235 (1994) (suggesting that although
on record three Balkan governments agreed to cooperate, judging from Bosnian Serb gov-
ernment refusal to extradite accused war criminals, Croatia and Bosnia would likely follow
suit); Karadzic Won't Cooperate with U.N. Tribunal, REUTERS WORLD SERV., May 26, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File (reporting that Karadzic asserted that,
until Bosnian-Serb Republic has been recognized by U.N., alleged criminals would be dealt
with by "our own national judiciary").
113 See Bland, supra note 96, at 271 (predicting that despite "laudable move" of creating
ICTY, "[p]ressure to negotiate an agreeable settlement to the bloody two-year-old war, cou-
pled with demands for immunity from suspected war criminals-peace negotiators, will
probably undermine any possibility of trying those responsible"); Kenneth S. Gallant, Se-
curing the Presence of Defendants Before the International Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557, 562 (1995) (arguing that international
obligation to surrender suspects to ICTYICTR is superior to any domestic law that might
otherwise prevent surrender or extradition); see also Gordon, supra note 31, at 228 (observ-
ing that in Rwanda "primacy of ICTR [might] cause conflict with the domestic courts anx-
ious to prosecute all culprits" as ICTR not is "openly accepted by all Rwandans"); Gerry J.
Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L. REv. 801, 837
(1997) (noting that "[d]omestic laws have been applied in an irregular and often dubious
manner to a very small number of suspected war criminals" and that "[miunicipal tribunals
have been proven unsatisfactory, subjective and selective in their definitions of war crimes
and crimes against humanity"). But see Mark S. Martins, National Forums for Furnishing
Offenses Against International Law: Might U.S. Soldiers Have their Day in the Same
Court?, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 659, 659 (1996) (asserting that ICTY "reflects great interest in
meeting procedural aspect of challenge" of trying war criminals, and that "rules of proce-
dure and evidence represent a robust framework of due process").
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ever, is gained through a close reading of the ICTY Statute's ac-
companying Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("P&E Rules"). 1 14
First, in the event a state takes no action "within a reasonable
time" upon the issuance of an ICTY warrant, Rule 59(B) of the
ICTY's P&E 115  ambiguously asserts that such inaction be
"deemed a failure to execute the warrant" and that the ICTY "may
notify the Security Council accordingly." 16 Subsequently, where
such failure to execute a warrant is due to the "failure or refusal of
a State to cooperate" with the ICTY, under the similarly ambigu-
ous mandate of P&E rule 61(E)," 7 the ICTY's only recourse ap-
114 See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted Feb. 11, 1994), available
in 33 I.L.M. 484 (1994) [hereinafter P&E Rules]. The Rules were adopted on February 11,
1994. Id. at Bruce Zagaris, Introductory Note. Zagaris remarks that P&E rules are histori-
cally significant "for public international law . . .because of the relative novelty of the
[ICTY] and perhaps, even more importantly, for the precedent they set for the establish-
ment of a permanent ICC"). Id. While the ICTY's competence is presumed superior to na-
tional courts, Rule 9 anticipates that "if within 60 days after an [ICTY] request for deferral
has been made the national state fails to respond satisfactorily, the [ICTY] may request
[that its] President [ ] report the matter to the Security Council [for appropriate action]."
Id. at 486. But see Cotic, supra note 112, at 233. Above and beyond any consideration of
the P&E Rules, a prevailing view among Serbian legal experts is that the Security Council
exceeded its mandate altogether in setting up ICTY (and ICTR) under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, since such Tribunals are not "subsidiary organs" of the Security Council. Id.
Rather, the "establishment of the [ICTY] is viewed as an assertion of political supremacy
over small nations that would not be attempted in relation to big powers." Id.
115 See P&E Rules, supra note 114, Rule 59. Part A provides: "Where the State to which
a warrant of arrest has been transmitted has been made unable to execute the warrant, it
shall report forthwith its inability to the Registrar, and the reasons therefor." Id. at 518.
116 Id. at 518. Part B provides: "If, within a reasonable time after the warrant of arrest
has been transmitted to the State, no report is made on action taken, this shall be deemed a
failure to execute the warrant of arrest and the Tribunal, through the President, may no-
tify the Security Council accordingly." Id. But see Schmandt, supra note 51, at 363. As one
plausible rationale for this dilemma, Schmandt proposes that in view of the "world's lack of
commitment after acknowledging such horrendous crimes," the catch-22 obstacle is that
"indicting political leaders in the midst of negotiations could certainly have a chilling effect
on [those] negotiations." Id.
117 See P&E Rules, supra note 114, Rule 61(E). Paragraph E provides:
If the Prosecutor satisfies the Trial Chamber that the failure to effect personal service
was due in whole or in part to a failure or refusal of a State to cooperate with the
Tribunal in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber shall so cer-
tify, in which event the President shall notify the Security Council.
Id. at 519-20; see also Mutua, supra note 34, at 181-82. The ICTY prosecutor depends on
the cooperation of the very States of the former Yugoslavia "the perpetrators of war crimes
themselves, for assistance to apprehend suspects and to gain access to evidence." Id. at 181.
However, as the meager numbers of those war criminals rounded up shows, "states have
been reluctant to assist the [ICTY] in tracking down suspects" and "[iun some cases states
have refused to cooperate." Id. at 182. To further complicate matters, "[s]hort of imposing
economic or other sanctions, a course of action that is unlikely, the United Nations cannot
force compliance by a recalcitrant state." Id.
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pears to be "to notify the Security Council."118 A cursory reading of
these rules quickly demonstrates the lack of a necessary and effec-
tive enforcement mechanism which has compromised the pur-
ported judicial authority of the ICTY. In support of the ICTY, Art.
IX of the Dayton initiative's General Framework Agreement
("GFA")1 9 requires such signatories as the Bosnian authorities to
fully cooperate with and grant unrestricted access to the ICTY.120
Presumably, under a joint reading of the ICTY/P&E and GFA,
then, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and the FRY are all required to sur-
render persons indicted for war crimes upon the request of the
Tribunal. 12 1 Clearly, this ideal has yet to be realized, as the
ICTY's "authority" has been skirted and impeded at every turn,
due in part to the "toothless" language of the ICTY/P&E rules. 1 22
118 See P&E Rules, supra note 114, Rule 61(E), at 520 (providing that failure or refusal
of state to effect personal service of ICTY arrest warrant shall be sufficient cause for ICTY
President to notify UN Security Council); see also Gallant, supra note 113, at 560 (com-
menting that Rule 61(E) "change in terminology reflects important conceptual and opera-
tive differences between transfer or surrender under the [ICTY] Statute and under tradi-
tional extradition").
119 See Framework Agreement, supra note 110, art. IX, at 90. Article IX sets forth that:
The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this
peace settlement, as described in the Annexes to this Agreement, or which are other-
wise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of
all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other
violations of international humanitarian law.
Id.
120 See id.; see also Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations to Search For and
Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DUKE J. Comp. &
INT'L L. 411, 443 (1997). Beyond acknowledging and reaffirming "the obligation of all Par-
ties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of
international law," under Article X of Annex 1-A, the parties further agreed to fully cooper-
ate with ICTY procedures. Id.; Paul C. Szasz, The Protection of Human Rights Through the
Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. IN'rL L. 301, 301 (1996). The Bosnia
Proximity Peace Talks culminated in the initialing of the General Framework Agreement
for Peace on November 21, 1995, near Dayton, Ohio by the representatives of the principal
Balkan States, and as witnessed by representatives of the EU. Id.; see also William L.
Hurlock, The International Court of Justice: Effectively Providing A Long Overdue Remedy
for Ending State-Sponsored Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 299, 299 (1997). The General Framework Agreement was subsequently
signed in Paris, France on December 14, 1995, "officially" ending the ethnically-driven hos-
tilities in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Id.
121 See P&E Rules, supra note 114, Rule 61(E), at 519-20 (setting forth procedure
whereby ICTY President was required to notify UN Security Council in event of member
state's failure to serve ICTY-issued arrest warrant); Framework Agreement, supra note
110, art. IX (mandating full cooperation of all signatories in implementation of peace settle-
ment); see also P&E Rules, supra note 114, Rule 57 (explaining procedure for arrest, deten-
tion, and transfer of accused to Hague seat of ICTY); id. Rule 58 (declaring that Article 29
of ICTY Statute shall preempt any impediments under national law otherwise blocking
extradition).
122 See P&E Rules, supra note 114, Rule 59(B), at 518 (proposing that in event State fails
to execute ICTY arrest warrant, ICTY President "may notify the Security Council accord-
ingly") [emphasis supplied]; see also Framework Agreement, supra note 110, art IX, at 90
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In fact, as it will be discussed presently, further indicia of the
ICTY's compromised enforcement authority is evinced from the
conflicting and otherwise "absent" language of Security Council
Resolution 103123 and the UNPROFOR/IFOR initiative. 124
(declaring that all parties freely agree to be bound by pact and to cooperate in apprehension
of war criminals); Krass, supra note 105, at 350 (noting that perceived problems with ICTY
include "obtaining custody of defendants, the difficulties with establishing a chain of com-
mand, and the tribunal's potential interference with the peace process"); id. (asserting that
ICTY was criticized for being "politicized and dominated by states whose nationals [were]
not subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction" and because ICTY's "jurisdiction [was] limited to
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991"); Howard S. Levie, A Comparison
with the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 23 (1995) (noting
that given tight socioeconomic interdependence, Yugoslavian territories cannot be expected
to surrender personnel to ICTY for prosecution).
123 See S.C. Res. 1034, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3612th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1034
(1995) [hereinafter Resolution 1034]. Apart from "affirming," "reaffirming," "urging," "con-
demning," and "strongly condemning," conspicuously absent from Resolution 1034's man-
dates are any viable means of enforcement. Id. [emphasis supplied]; Szasz, supra note 120,
at 314. Through Resolution 1034, the Security Council "merely noted approvingly that the
[Dayton] Peace Agreement prohibits persons sentenced or indicted by the [ICTY] from
holding public office in Bosnia." Id. Resolution 1034, however, "conspicuously failed to spec-
ify any additional powers or tasks to assist the [ICTY]" in fulfillment of its juridical mis-
sion. Id.
124 See U.N. S.C. Res. 743, Establishing the United Nations Protection Force, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992), available in 31 I.L.M.
1427, 1447-48 (1992) [hereinafter UNPROFOR]. In pertinent part, Resolution 743
provides:
The Security Council, reaffirming its resolutions ... Convinced that the implementa-
tion of the United Nations peace-keeping plan... will assist the Conference on Yugo-
slavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it, to ensure a peaceful settlement
1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 15 February 1992 (S/23280);
2. Decides to establish, under its authority, a United Nations Protection Force (UN-
PROFOR) in accordance with the above-mentioned report and the United Nations
peace-keeping plan and requests the Secretary-General to take the measures neces-
sary to ensure its earliest possible deployment[.]
Id. at 1447-48; see also Report of the Secretary-General on the Transition from UNPROFOR
to IFOR and Addendum on Cost Estimates, Including Security Council Resolutions 1031
(1995) and 1035 (1995), Addressing the Political Settlement in the Former Yugoslavia and
the Transfer of Power from UNPROFOR to IFOR (13-21 December 1995), S.C. Res. 1035,
U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3613th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (1995), available in 35
I.L.M. 235, 235 [hereinafter Report on the UNPROFOR/IFOR Transition]. S.C. Resolution
1035 sets out in pertinent part:
The Security Council, Recalling its resolution 1031 (1995) of 15 Dec. 1995 recalling also
the General Framework Agreement ....
2. Decides to establish, for a period of one year from the transfer of authority from the
United Nations Protection Force to be known as the International Police Task Force
(IFOR), a United Nations civilian police force to be known as the International Police
Task Force (IPTF) to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of the Peace
Agreement ...
Id.; see also Alan K. Henrikson, The United Nations and Regional Organizations: "King-
Links" of a "Global Chain", 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35, 36 (1996). On December 20,
1995, a changing of the guard was completed whereby UNPROFOR "was succeeded by an
alliance-based multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) commanded by NATO and with
the UN's authority." Id. But see Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protecting the Avatars of Interna-
tional Peace and Security, 7 DuKE J. Comp. & INT'L L. 93, 160-61 (1996). At a 1996 com-
mencement address given in Germany to American students, Judge Richard Goldstone,
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In the first instance, on December 21, 1995, on the heels of the
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (the GFA), the UN Secur-
ity Council issued Resolution 1034.125 The apparent impetus of
the Resolution was to rubber stamp the GFA's reaffirmance that
no persons indicted by the Tribunal be allowed to serve in public
office in Bosnia. 126 One immediate drawback of this Resolution,
however, was the conspicuous absence of any affirmative language
specifying any supplementary powers or means of assisting the
Tribunal to carry out its mandate vis-&-vis the goals established
by the GFA. 127 On its face, this would proffer yet another explana-
tion as to the dilemma of the Tribunal's relative ineffectiveness.
G. Of Paper Tigers, Tin Soldiers and Opportunities Lost
On the other hand, the UNPROFOR/IFOR initiative provides
an even more compelling insight as to the War Crimes Tribunal's
handcuffed efforts in effecting the arrest of indicted war criminals
Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, "urged IFOR to take a more robust approach in arresting
suspects and condemned IFOR's policy of refraining from action because of the dangers
involved." Id. at 160-61.
125 See Resolution 1034, supra note 123, at 235. The net effect of Resolution 1034 was to
rubber stamp the Dayton Peace Agreement and to endorse the establishment of IFOR. Id.;
Szasz, supra note 120, at 314. In a lengthy Resolution 1034, the Security Council "merely
noted approvingly that the Peace Agreement prohibits persons sentenced or indicted by the
Tribunal from holding public office in Bosnia." Id. The Council, however, "conspicuously
failed to specify any additional [enforcement] powers or tasks to assist the Tribunal" in
fulfilling its mission. Id. But see Peace Agreements Bring a "Long-Delayed Birth of Hope":
Multinational Force Set Up in Bosnia to Replace UNPROFOR, U.N. CHRON. March 22,
1996, at 25, available in 1996 WL 10924410. A more enthusiastic appraisal of Resolution
1034's promulgation suggests that the Bosnian Serb party might in all seriousness even
consider the Security Council's "strong urging" to "give immediate and unimpeded access"
into war-torn areas to U.N. personnel "for the purposes of the investigation of atrocities."
Id.
126 See Stephen Albert, The Dayton Agreement: Peace with Dishonor, AR-AB AM. NEWS,
Dec. 8, 1995, at 6, available in 1995 WL 15280591 (criticizing that from very start ICTY
and Dayton Peace Talks proceeded on two separate tracks, insofar as "[ilnternational law
has meaning only if there are effective mechanisms for its enforcement-something clearly
lacking in the rift between ICTY and Peace Accord"); U.S. Steps Up Pressure on Milosevic
to Oust Karadzic, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3858494 (re-
porting that U.S. pressured Serbian President Milosevic to remove "hardline Bosnian Serb
Leader Karadzic" under threat of sanctions).
127 See War Crimes Chief to Call for Sanctions Against Serbs, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, June
6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3866541 (reporting that Chief Justice Cassese of ICTY called
for reimposition of sanctions against Bosnian Serbs who had "failed to hand over indicted
war crime suspects" and who had been generally uncooperative); see also Bosnian Serbs
Against Sending Brethern to War Crimes Tribunal, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 3, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 3848550 (quoting Bosnian Serb Premier Kasagic as arguing: "We do
not refuse to cooperate with the [ICTY], but sending alleged war criminals is a more diffi-
cult question since it is against our constitution"). But see Sharp, supra note 120, at 443
(describing virtually unbridled authority of IFOR Commander to deploy military power at
his discretion in order to protect IFOR and insure it carried out its mandate).
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in the area of the former Yugoslavia. 1 28 The original objective of
UNPROFOR, and its successor, IFOR, established under the con-
sensus of the five permanent members of the Security Council,
was threefold.129 UNPROFOR/IFOR sought to diffuse the humani-
tarian consequences of the conflict, to contain it within the terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia, and to facilitate a peaceful resolu-
tion of the hostilities. 3 0 In addition to having been described as
being purely "reactive," more important, these goals also failed to
define a clear political objective on the part of the external UN
powers in implementing UNPROFOR/IFOR.131 Specifically, dur-
128 See Berdal, supra note 8, at 77. One plausible scenario proffered to help explain this
dilemma is that, in view of the questionable multinational effort waged against Iraq in the
Gulf War, there was no great haste or determination among parties external to the Balkan
conflict to enter that fray. Id. Nor, for that matter, did anyone hasten to take sides or to
interpret the jumbled priorities of self-determination, jus cogens, and "ethnic cleansing" as
merely a "black and white issue calling for enforcement action." Id.; see also Henrikson,
supra note 124, at 36. Chief ICTY Prosecutor Goldstone has been highly critical of IFOR
insofar as IFOR's "hands-off" policy in the Balkans has impeded the mission of the ICTY.
Id. But see Albert, supra note 126, at 6. The troubling issue of IFOR's abject failure to
enforce arrest warrants is far outshadowed by the greater peril that peace and security
possibly may never be achieved in the Balkans due to the philosophical rift between a very
pragmatic ICTY's efforts being undercut by an ambitious yet toothless U.N. peace initia-
tive. Id.
129 See Berdal, supra note 8, at 76-77 (setting forth and explaining nature of tri-partite
enforcement objective via UNPROFOR's presence in Balkans).
130 Id. at 76-77. Specifically, Berdal explains that, from 1991 through 1995, the consen-
sus among the five permanent members of the Security Council regarding:
[T]he U.N.'s role in the former Yugoslavia under the aegis of the United Nations Pro-
tective Force (UNPROFOR) was confined to three basic objectives: (1) relieving as far
as possible the humanitarian consequences of the war; (2) containing the conflict to the
territories of the former Yugoslavia; and (3) encouraging and facilitating a negotiated
solution among parties.
Id. But see King, supra note 88, at 358. Painting a more positive version of a bleak picture
of the overall UNPROFOR/IFOR enforcement debate, King argues that since UN-
PROFOR's inception, the Security Council in fact focused its efforts on "enforcing, ex-
panding, and reinforcing UNPROFOR's mandate" to foster an environment of peace and
security. Id. To better achieve the foregoing aim, particularly in view of providing humani-
tarian aid in the face of mounting atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the laissez-faire ration-
ale goes that "the Council deferred the task of negotiating an overall political settlement of
the conflict to the [EC], urging the three communities in Bosnia to participate in the ongo-
ing discussions." Id.
131 See Berdal, supra note 8, at 77. Supporting this very conclusion, in 1994 William
Shawcross remarked that, in fact, "the Western powers [had] 'never defined a political ob-
jective for former Yugoslavia.'" Id.; Stephen A. Wangsgard, Secession, Humanitarian Inter-
vention, and Clear Objectives: When to Commit United States Military Forces, 3 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 313, 333-34 (1996). Similarly, the Clinton Administration was criticized
for failing "to articulate clear and convincing policy objectives for intervening in Bosnia."
Id.; cf Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary Interna-
tional Law Prohibit the Use of Nuclear Weapons in all Circumstances?, 20 FoRDHAM INT'L
L.J. 181, 208 (1996). It is argued that the "laws of war establish restrictions on the conduct
of hostilities, and attempt to balance the necessities of war with humanitarian principles."
Id. In this regard, therefore, "[b]y regulating when states may initiate war and states' sub-
sequent actions during war, the laws of war seek to limit armed conflicts." Id.
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ing the years of its operation (from 1992-95), the lack of a clearly
defined objective plus the contradictory mandate that it take a
more aggressive stance without compromising its original
peacekeeping status, frustrated UNPROFOR's long-term peace
enforcement efforts.' 32 A 1995 U.N. report described the dilemma
shouldered by UNPROFOR as one which required it to assume
normal peacekeeping rules while implementing functions adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.133
The consequences of this contradictory mandate were subse-
quently inherited by UNPROFOR's successor, IFOR.13 4 In 1995,
132 See Berdal, supra note 8, at 78 (noting that while UNPROFOR sought to reconcile its
contradictory aims it was forced to contend with concomitant conflicting pressure from
U.N. members "to take more forceful action" without compromising its peacekeeping man-
date); Elgin Clemons, No Peace to Keep: Six and Three Quarters Peacekeepers, 26 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 107, 123 (1993) (observing that in view of highly political nature of
peacekeeping actions in "civil war settings" recently, efforts of U.N. are more likely to fail
than "glorified sentry missions" of past); see also id. at 134 (describing Dag Hammarskjold
model of"aggressive peacekeeping" whereby neutral peacekeepers' "military presence" pre-
sumed to deter continued hostilities).
133 See Berdal, supra note 8, at 78 (quoting Report of the Secretary-General Submitted
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 982 (1995)). As characterized by Berdal, the scope
of the Report went thus:
While the function UNPROFOR was tasked to implement was adopted under Chapter
VII of the [UN] Charter..., the resolution determining its deployment assumed nor-
mal peacekeeping rules of engagement. UNPROFOR's mandate became further com-
plicated by resolutions referring to Chapter VII for security and freedom of movement
purposes, without clearly defining the tasks or ramifications emanating from them.
Id.; see also Christine Gray, Host State Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugo-
slavia, 7 DuKE J. Comp. & INT'L L. 241, 258 (1996). Despite the fact that UNPROFOR was
originally deployed as a peacekeeping force which acted only pursuant to the consent of
host states, the U.N. later invoked Chapter VII authority thereby binding the host states to
cooperate with UNPROFOR. Id.; Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Recon-
struction of Article 2(7) and Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 353, 450 n.304 (1996). It is theorized that the U.N.'s "peacekeeping authority"
does not derive from any one article under the Charter, but that such authority is implicit
in the Security Council's mandate under the Charter "to maintain international peace and
security in accordance with the Charter's purposes and principles." Id.
134 See UNPROFOR, supra note 124, at 1447-48. UNPROFOR was implemented as a
multinational peacekeeping force in an attempt to restore peace and security in the war
torn former Yugoslavia. Id.; see also Report on the UNPROFORIIFOR Transition, supra
note 124, at 238. The Secretary reports that:
One of the matters yet to be finalized is the composition of IFOR. I am not therefore in
a position to report with certainty which of the UNPROFOR contingents will partici-
pate in IFOR and, as a result, how many of the troops currently serving in UN-
PROFOR will need to be withdrawn from the theatre. However, on the basis of consul-
tations with troop-contributing countries, it can be assumed that the larger part of the
UNPROFOR units will transfer to IFOR.
Id. at art. II, para. 9; Joe Byrnes Sills, United Nations Peacekeeping: The Years Past, the
Years Ahead, 24 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 451, 454 (1996). UNPROFOR's original mandate
in Croatia was to maintain a cease-fire and foster an environment conducive to a "political
settlement." Id. Subsequently, UNPROFOR's mandate was extended to Bosnia-Herzego-
vina and ultimately expanded "to include border control, protecting the 'safe areas', super-
vising the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the exclusion zones, and assisting in the
implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreements." Id.
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the UN Security Council relegated UNPROFOR's "peace enforce-
ment" authority to NATO which was reconfigured in the form of
IFOR.13 5 From the very outset, however, despite its formidable
military presence in Bosnia, IFOR was reported as having
"balked" at the prospect of seeking out and apprehending indicted
war criminals or of protecting reputed crime areas, both in direct
contravention of its mandate. 136 One can only speculate as to what
motivated IFOR to commit such a direct breach of its mandate.
Keeping in mind the ends sought through the Dayton Agreement,
one might hazard the guess that the arrest of high ranking Bos-
nian Serb officials for war crimes could precipitate a threatened or
actual withdrawal of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Peace Ac-
cord. 1 37 A logical conclusion to be drawn then is that the shaky
peace achieved in Bosnia through the Dayton Agreement is to be
kept at all costs-even if it means allowing indicted war criminals
Karadzic and Mladic to skirt international justice and thumb
their noses at the authority of the ICTY and the credibility of the
UN in the process.
135 See Berdal, supra note 8, at 84 (noting that as of late 1995, UNPROFOR had been
replaced "by a much more robust" IFOR operating under direction and control of NATO);
see also Major Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Nationals Who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1, 92 n.180 (1996) (noting
that although operating pursuant to Safety Convention, U.S. armed forces and UN-
PROFORPIFOR forces were not under direct U.N. control; rather, authority to deploy forces
"arises from mandates of Security Council exercising its Chapter VII enforcement powers").
136 See James Podgers, The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda Hold the Key to the Next Advance in International Law, 82-APR A.B.A. J. 52,
61 (1996). It was reported that NATO peacekeepers, including about 20,000 U.S. troops
sent to former Yugoslavia, "balked" at either seeking out war criminals or at protecting
sites of reported crimes. Id. Defending this "inaction", NATO/IFOR commanders rational-
ized that taking such actions "would constitute 'mission creep' and jeopardize the safety of
their troops." Id.; see also Robert 0. Weiner and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Beyond the Laws of
War: Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal Framework, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 293,312
(1996). A more egregious account from 1995 tells of a Dutch battalion of UNPROFOR
"charged with defending the Muslim population of Srebrenica," which failed to "prevent the
disappearance of literally thousands of young Muslims rounded up by Bosnian Serb
forces[ I." Id.; cf Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and
Military Operation, 7 DuKE J. COMp. & INT'L L. 3, 21 (1996). By 1996, UNPROFOR's posi-
tion was extremely weakened and its authority "murky" to the point where Bosnian Serbs
resorted to "holding UN peacekeepers hostage to deter further NATO action." Id.
137 See Podgers, supra note 136, at 61. Bosnian Serbs threatened to withdraw from the
Dayton Accord upon the arrest of two top Serbian military officials suspected of war crimes.
Id. Eventually, so that the Bosnian Serbs might abide by the Accord, the Bosnian govern-
ment was forced to agree that it would make no further arrests. Id. at 62; see also Sharp,
supra note 120, at 454. Moreover, it was feared that the arrest of indicted officials could
"shatter Bosnia's fragile peace" and precipitate further hostilities. Id. But see id. at 456-57.
Despite these misgivings, a Bosnian Serb military official informed NATO that Karadzic's
arrest would not provoke a violent reaction among the Bosnian Serbs, and that the Serb
military was indifferent to Karadzic being deposed. Id.
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On a final note, it has also been suggested that the telling an-
swer to the foregoing dilemma may lie within the contradictory
official language of the IFOR mandate itself.138 Suffice it to say
that, regardless of the attributable source of the problem, the War
Crimes Tribunal's abject ineffectiveness in meting out interna-
tional justice demonstrates the urgency for a stronger long-term
solution in the form of an independent International Criminal
Court. 139 The overwhelming international consensus regarding
the need to prosecute war criminals and human rights violators in
the former Yugoslavia now affords the UN the propitious opportu-
nity to create such a permanent International Criminal Court.'4 °
138 See S.C. Res. 1035, supra note 124, at 256. Through Resolution 1035, the UN Secur-
ity Council officially declared its mandate:
Decid[ing] to establish, for a period of one year from the transfer of authority from the
United Nations Protection Force to the multinational implementation force (IFOR), a
United Nations civilian police force to be known as the International Police Task Force
(IPTF) to be entrusted with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement and
a United Nations civilian office with the responsibilities set out in the report of the
Secretary-General, and to that end endorses the arrangements set out in the report of
the Secretary-General[.]
Id. at para. 2; Berdal, supra note 128, at 89-89. Similarly, the UNPROFOR mandate
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "assum[ing] normal peacekeeping rules," is
also muddled by implementing UN Resolutions which make concomitant references to
Chapter VII within a "security and freedom of movement" context. Id. (quoting Report of
the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 982 (1995)). But
see NATO, U.N. Court Reach Agreement on Arresting War Crimes Suspects, AGENCE FR.-
PRESS, May 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3851628. European news agencies reported that
after months of inactivity by NATO regarding the arrest of war criminals indicted by the
ICTY, the ICTY and NATO signed an agreement "outlining what the peace force in Bosnia
should do to bring suspected war criminals to justice." Id. But according to NATO, for the
most part, all the pact sought to accomplish was to "establish[ ] a code of conduct for the
60,000-strong peace force[.1" Id. Indeed, while under the pact "IFOR will continue to sup-
port as fully as possible the ICTY (and) provide surveillance of sites which are of interest,"
NATO nevertheless "stress [ed] that IFOR is not obliged to hunt down the 54 Serbs, Croats
and Moslems from Bosnia and three federal Yugoslav officers indicted by the court." Id. A
review of these objectives together with IFOR's official mandate, as set forth in UN Resolu-
tion 1035, suggests that NATO, in clear contravention of Resolution 1035, unilaterally ab-
dicated from its law enforcement responsibility thereunder, ignoring and thereby trumping
altogether the UN Security Council's authority to establish IFOR. Id.
139 See Wilson, supra note 38, at 1 (citing anticipated diplomatic conference in Rome,
Italy in 1998 for ratification of ICC convention); see also M. CherifBassiouni, The Time Has
Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (1991)
(examining various models upon which to establish international court); Guffey-Landers,
supra note 39, at 201 (analyzing proposals for international criminal court vis-A-vis ex-
isting system for carrying out international justice); cf Sontosus, supra note 97, at 32 (stat-
ing that if ICC existed victors' psychological dilemma would be partly obviated).
140 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They
Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 397 (1992) (noting that
members of General Assembly from Netherlands, Canada, Georgia and Italy called on In-
ternational Law Commission to develop International Criminal Court with aim of prosecut-
ing political and military leaders who ordered or condoned atrocities); Rose Marie Karad-
sheh, Creating an International Criminal Court: Confronting the Conflicting Criminal
Procedures ofIran and the United States, 14 DicK. J. INT'L L. 243, 251 (1996) (discussing
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The efficacy of such a forum will inevitably turn on separating the
legal process of indictments and prosecutions from the immediate
political conffict, and more important, the legal process from the
actual negotiation process itself.1
4 1
III. AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: FROM PLOWSHARES
TO SWORDS
A. Reevaluating Juridical Priorities: Moving Away from
"Victor's Justice"
Ideally, the War Crimes Tribunal's successful prosecution of
human rights violators would signal the dawning of a new age in
the annals of international justice, whereby "might" would no
longer necessarily make "right," and where military and political
power would ultimately be subordinated to a higher law.142 But
the world in which we live is far short of ideal. This, however, did
not stop United States Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy
from foreshadowing just such an eventuality in his famous dissent
four major positions taken by U.N. states concerning creation of ICC); see also G.A. Res.
2840, supra note 107, at 79 (declaring that state's refusal to cooperate in extradition of war
criminals violates UN Charter). But see Blakesley, supra note 105, at 78 (stating that "pri-
macy of a permanent tribunal may be unacceptable to some UN Charter states").
141 See Krass, supra note 105, at 352 (recognizing independent ICC would rid itself of ad
hoc ICTY constraints by being "free of partiality and politicization" and therefore being
"more [able] to resolve cases on the merits"); Sontosus, supra note 97, at 32 (stating that if
ICC were implemented ethical dilemma of victors would be partly obviated); see also
Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and American Con-
cerns, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 121, 158 (1994) (arguing that establishment of permanent court
would better address concerns of international community); Krass, supra note 105, at 354
(noting that those states unwilling to extradite war criminals might otherwise "cede juris-
diction to an international criminal court").
142 See Michael D. Greenberg, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 119, 130 (1992). Political neutrality would be vital to an ICC's authority and endur-
ance in that, to the extent that such a court is indeed "objective [it would] enjoy no more
international support than a court merely appearing to embrace such equity." Id.; see also
William N. Granaris, The New World Order and the Need for an International Criminal
Court, 16 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 110 (1992). Moreover, an ICC's neutral approach would
likely obviate reliance on a given nation's superior military or economic power. Id.; cf Fer-
encz, supra note 140, at 397. Ironically, during the 1992 meeting of the UN General Assem-
bly, the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina himself "requested an international war
crimes tribunal . . . as a prerequisite for peace[.]" Id. But see Michael Scharf and Valerie
Epps, The International Trial of the Century?: A "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First Case
Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635, 643 (1996). Since
the ICTY was designed to function "independently of political considerations," and free of
Security Council authority, theoretically, nothing prevented the ICTY "from prosecuting
Russian, British, or American citizens that... participated as mercenaries in the fighting
in the former Yugoslavia." Id.
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in In re Yamashita.'43 There, Justice Murphy objected to the con-
cept of the "victor's justice" characteristic of the post-WWII Nazi
war crimes trials."' Criticizing the majority's stance, Justice
Murphy emphasized that for order ever to prevail among the in-
ternational community on the basis of "human dignity," of para-
mount importance is that the punishment of those guilty of war
crimes be devoid of the "ugly stigma" of revenge and vindica-
tion.14 Indeed, it has been argued that absent the encumbrance of
"victor's justice" and political restraints, charges of war crimes
could also have been brought against WWII's Allied powers by
prosecutors.146 For example, the internment of American citizens
of Japanese and Italian ancestry, the dropping of two atomic
bombs on Japanese civilians, and the firebombing of Dresden,
were official U.S. acts readily classifiable as "war crimes."' 4 This
143 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (decrying
highly prejudicial repercussions of so-called "victor's justice"); Fred Barbash, War Tribunal
Targets Three Bosnian Serbs Top Leaders Linked to "Mass Killings", WASH. POST, Apr. 25,
1995, at Al (reporting that indictments were expected to be issued in mid-1995 against
twenty-seven Bosnian Croats for their 1993 assault on Bosnian village resulting in deaths
of 114 Muslim civilians); see also Framework Agreement, Nov. 21, 1995, supra note 110,
art. 9 (mandating cooperation in prosecution of war crimes and violations of international
humanitarian law). But see Santosus, supra note 96, at 28 (pointing out that despite its
desirability International Criminal Court is not unanimously supported).
144 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 29-30 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (recognizing potential pitfalls
and conflicts of "victor's justice" relating to post-WWII Nuremberg trials and imploring
implementation of international justice devoid of "stigma of revenge and vindictiveness" on
victor's part); see also Bland, supra note 96, at 260 (recognizing extant notion of "victor's
justice" even today impeding success and objectivity of ad hoc tribunals).
145 See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 29-30 (Murphy, J., dissenting). To this end, Justice Mur-
phy urged the majority to "insist... that the highest standards ofjustice be applied in thte]
trial of an enemy commander conducted under the authority of the United States." Id. To
do otherwise, warned Justice Murphy, would allow "stark retribution.., to masquerade in
a cloak of false legalism." Id. at 30; see also Roberts, supra note 46, at 24. Roberts discusses
the politicized one-sidedness of the former Nuremberg and Tokyo WWII tribunals. Id. But
see Sheldon Glueck, The Nurenberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HIv. L. REV. 396, 452
(1946). Early on it was recognized that, despite charges of "victor's justice," albeit in a lim-
ited sense, the Nuremberg proceedings were conducted according to prevailing common law
notions of due process which provided the accused with their day in court. Id.; Bernard D.
Meltzer, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 469
(1946-47). Even conceding that the Allies' "selective prosecution" was tantamount to
victor's justice, it has been argued that the "greater depravity of the Nazis" justified the
Allies' "comparatively minor deviations from accepted usages [which otherwise would] not
have occurred." Id.
146 See Scharf & Epps, supra note 142, at 643 (suggesting that tribunal like ICTY func-
tioning "independently of political considerations" is free to prosecute all perpetrators of
war crimes regardless of their respective nations' role in conflict); cf Steven Fogelson, The
Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 833, 859-61 (1990) (arguing
that Nuremberg was "merely a political 'show trial' meant to carry out the will of the vic-
tors"). But see Meltzer, supra note 145, at 469 (justifying Allies' "selective prosecution" in
view of Nazis' unprecedented depravity).
147 See Fogelson, supra note 146, at 859-860 (discussing how critics have argued that
Allied Powers exercised arbitrary and illegal "victor's justice" over defeated Axis Powers);
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line of reasoning is readily applicable to the acts of the various
political players embroiled in the recent Balkan conflict.
141
Hence, while Serbian humanitarian law violations arguably
have been the most pronounced, 149 a blanket recognition by the
War Crimes Tribunal that all sides-be they Serb, Croat, Muslim,
French or British, or any other actors in the conflict-have con-
tributed to the atrocities, would lend greater credibility to the Tri-
bunal's authority as an impartial dispenser of justice.15 ° In an
James Brooke, After Silence, Italians Recall the Internment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at
A10 (recounting involuntary internment of Italian-Americans in Missoula, Montana during
WWII); see also Roberts, supra note 46, at 24 (noting criticism of Nuremberg trials based on
indifference to war crimes committed by Allies); Kristen M. Schuler, Equal Protection and
the Undocumented Immigrant: California's Proposition 187, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275,
289 (1996) (quoting Roger Daniels, Why It Happened Here, in RACISM IN CALIFORNIA: A
READER IN THE HISTORY OF OPPRESSION 167 (Roger Daniels & Spencer C. Olin, Jr. eds.,
1972)) (suggesting "exclusion and internment of Japanese-Americans... [was] most wide-
spread disregard of personal rights since slavery"); cf Santosus, supra note 96, at 32 (stat-
ing that "a permanent ICC would leave nations with less discretion to adjudicate criminal
cases in which they take an interest"). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
217-18 (1944) (holding that involuntary internment of American citizens of Japanese an-
cestry during WWII was reasonably related to prevention of espionage and sabotage and
was therefore justified under war power of Congress).
148 See Schmandt, supra note 51, at 341-43. During the Balkan conflict, in addition to
the thousands of civilians maimed and slaughtered "in the two-year siege of Sarajevo,"
there were also widespread reports of young girls and women being raped and killed for
sport. Id. at 342. The nature and frequency of these war crimes suggested "that individual
soldiers as well as entire military units d[id] not anticipate disciplinary action from their
superiors." Id. at 343; see also Kathleen M. Pratt and Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice:
The Case for International Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 86 (1994). Not to be overlooked is the fact that,
despite the majority of rapes and ethnic atrocities being attributable to Bosnian Serbs, the
very same crimes, albeit to a lesser degree, were also perpetrated by "Bosnian Muslim and
Croatian forces against Serbian women." Id. See generally Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of
the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 229, 239-40
(1995). In Resolution 935, the Commission of Experts' interim report verified a systematic
campaign of genocide against the Tutsi group of Rwanda and urged the Security Council to
implement what was to become the ICTR. Id.
149 See Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugo-
slavia: The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
235, 248 (1994) (discussing reports of Serbian human rights violations targeted at Bosnian
Muslims civilians); Michael P. Scharf and Lawrence D. Roberts, The Interstellar Relations
of the Federation: International Law and "Star Trek": The Next Generation, 25 U. TOL. L.
REV. 577, 612 (1994) (noting gross human rights violations encompassing over two million
displaced people); see also CROATIAN INFO. CENTER, supra note 26, at 107 (effectively her-
alding "ethnic cleansing", Karadzic openly proclaimed that only Serbians should populate
his new republic); Roger Cohen, End of Cold War Offers Chilling New Dangers, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 26, 1994, at 15A (recalling fall of communism in eastern bloc
countries and concomitant resurgence of violent ethno-racial nationalist movements);
150 See Krass, supra note 105, at 318. In order "to bring perpetrators of rape to justice," it
has been argued that a judicial forum, among other things, must "be impartial ... avoid
politicization ... [and] have an enforcement mechanism[.]" Id.; Paul D. Marquardt, Law
Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 73, 100 (1995). Given crises where opposing powers are unwilling to concede
to themselves the sovereign authority to sit in judgment of each other, "an international
court could dispense not only justice, but peace," as well as providing "valuable credibility
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ideal world, the "evenhanded enforcement" of international hu-
manitarian law would take precedence over the "one-sided prose-
cution" of genocide and war crimes like that which occurred at Nu-
remberg. 15 1 Suffice it to say, due to its impracticability, this
idealistic eventuality has been an elusive one. Rather, under a
more practical assessment of recent current events, the "even-
handed enforcement" of humanitarian law will be effectively ac-
complished through the imminent promulgation of an impartial
and permanent International Criminal Court.' 52
B. Carving Out a New Instrument from Old Doctrine
One of the main goals of the new world awareness forged
through the UN was to avert mankind's self-annihilation through
modern global warfare. 153 Consistent with this premise, a key con-
and legitimacy to help stem fears of retaliation by the victors." Id.; see also Bhattacharyya,
supra note 15, at 75. Not to be discounted in this regard is the distinct probability that the
implementation of a biased tribunal embodying notions of victor's justice "would cast inter-
national criminal law as no more than a tool of American foreign policy." Id.; Gordon Ire-
land, Ex Post Facto from Rome to Tokyo, 21 TEMPLE L.Q. 27, 56-57 (1947-48). On the heels
of the Nuremberg decisions it was posited that the "equitable principle of 'unclean hands'
would not provide a relevant defense .... selective prosecution is only of concern in so far
as it undermined the Tribunal's moral credibility." Id. But see Chesterman, supra note 109,
at 310. Regarding the ICTY and the ICTR, the U.N., it is argued, appears to have been
"more prepared to forgo bringing war criminals to 'justice' in order to preserve hopes of
peace in the Balkans." Id.
151 See Ireland, supra note 150, at 56-57 (addressing equitable principle of "unclean
hands" and concept of "victor's justice"); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 30 (1946)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (warning that majority's decision was akin to political retribution
masquerading in "cloak of false legalism"); Fogelson, supra note 146, at 860 (discussing
exercise of arbitrary and illegal "victor's justice" over defeated powers). But see Martins,
supra note 113, at 671 (suggesting that as Nuremberg Tribunal offered "full array of proce-
dural protections," court was devoid of outcome-determinative procedures giving rise to
"victor's justice").
152 See Schmandt, supra note 51, at 351 (arguing further that: "[a] tribunal in Yugosla-
via that can evenly apply international law to all guilty parties without the onus of selec-
tive enforcement will add strength to human rights norms and facilitate future enforce-
ment"); see also Santosus, supra note 96, at 25 (explaining existence of many potential
albeit solvable problems in establishing international criminal court). But see Blakesley,
supra note 105, at 81-82 (posing question of whether "history of so many attempts and so
few successes [at establishing ICC] suggests that the time is ripe for a permanent tribunal
or that a complete change in the international system is required before one will succeed");
Monroe Leigh, Evaluating Present Options for an International Criminal Court, 149 MIL. L.
REV. 113, 114 (1995) (noting that while U.S. supports ICC's establishment, "it is a chief
critic of the 1994 Draft Statute .... [and] wishes to limit the role of the Court by denying it
jurisdiction over broad categories of cases"); Simpson, supra note 113, at 838 (pointing out
that "in light of Nuremberg and Tokyo, there is no guarantee that the international or
cosmopolitan will necessarily be free of the preferences, prejudices and biases of the
national").
153 See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (describing post-WWII imperatives of U.N. as
achievement of international cooperation in solving problems of humanitarian character
and promotion of human rights and basic freedoms regardless of race, sex, language, or
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cern of the new alliance was to ensure that the atrocity of geno-
cide, visited principally on European Jews during the Nazi Holo-
caust of WWII, never rear its ugly head again.154 Ideally, a
starting point in attaining this goal would be the uniform recogni-
tion and protection of "international human rights" as jus cogens
or "peremptory norms" of international law by the world commu-
nity.155 Jus cogens rules "derive from principles that the legal con-
science of mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to coexistence in
the international community."5 6 Jus cogens norms are deemed to
religion); Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Peace, supra note 2, at 14 (reaffirming via
Resolution that principal aim of U.N. was maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity). But see Helen M. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global Non-
Proliferation Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 407, 408 (1994) (arguing that
despite end of Cold War and fading "risk of strategic nuclear war between superpowers ...
hazards posed by [ I dissemination of Soviet-produced nuclear weapons... [into] unstable
and hostile hands remains currently a top security concern for all nations"); Jost Delbruck,
Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets - Implications for Domestic Law: A European
Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL STUD. 9, 14 (1993) (noting that although specter of nuclear
annihilation today is remote, "universal peace and security are still in jeopardy"); Samuel
K Murumba, Grappling with a Croatian Moment: Sovereignty and the Quest for a Norma-
tive World Order, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 829, 844 (1993) (recounting that despite U.N.'s
promulgation to avert another Holocaust, by post-WWII inception of Cold War "UN itself
was thoroughly paralyzed: the General Assembly, by ideological blocs; the Security Coun-
cil, by the Superpower veto").
154 See VANDENBOSCH & HOGAN, supra note 1 (noting collective security principle ele-
ment of UN Charter); cf Chaney, supra note 99, at 78 (noting that "new era of global inter-
dependence emerged following WWI, as did a new era of warfare"); Miller, supra note 2, at
773 (discussing cooperation to make Security Council into military force to suppress ag-
gression across globe). But see Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur of the Commission on Human rights, U.N. GOAR, 47th Sess., Item 97, at 6-
7, U.N. Doc. A/47/666 (1992) [hereinafter Human Rights Rapporteur (chronicling full-
blown resurgence of WWII Holocaust-like specter of genocide reincarnated under Serbian
guise of "self-determination").
155 See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (describing core imperatives to be furthered through
U.N. as result of apocalyptic legacy left by World War II); U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7
(directing that matters of states' domestic affairs be precluded from scope of General As-
sembly's purview of discussion and recommendation); Kunstle, supra note 102, at 319 (re-
counting horrors of "ethnic cleansing" campaign alleged to have been implemented and
ordered by Radovan Karadzic, President of self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb Republic of Srp-
ska, under pseudo-nationalistic guise of "self-determination").
156 See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise: Ampli-
fying Content-Based Speech Regulations Through Binding International Law, 18 B.C. INT'L
& Comp. L. REv. 59, 90 (1995). Jus cogens is closely interrelated with Dutch jurist Hugo
Grotius' 1625 conception of international law. Id.; Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, 23 May 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, in force 27 January 1990, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Under the Vienna Con-
vention, jus cogens is defined as: "[A] norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character." Id. art. 53; see also Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicara-
gua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court suggested that the U.S. may
have violated "peremptory norms of international law .... referred to as jus cogens (or
'compelling law'), which enjoy the highest status in international law and prevail over both
customary international law and treaties." Id.
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be the highest rules of international law.' 5 7 The universality ofjus
cogens norms lies in their binding, mandatory, and peremptory
nature. 158 Thus, jus cogens will void otherwise valid international
treaties, agreements, instruments, acts or orders where the latter
conflict with or contravene the norms of the former.15 9
Of course, the recognition of these "inalienable" jus cogens
rights can be achieved on an international scale only once UN
member (as well as non-UN member) nations agree to make uni-
versal concessions.' 60 To begin with, all nations would need to
157 See Karen Parker and Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human
Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & Coup. L. REV. 411, 415 (1989) The authors note the words of a
Mexican delegate to the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties when she spoke ofjus
cogens. Id. The adoption ofjus cogens is urged as one way to enhance human rights protec-
tion domestically, as "jus cogens norms exist and are enforceable independently of treaties,
and are immune from many judicial doctrines that have frustrated redress." Id.; see also
Philippe Lieberman, Expropriation, Torture, and Jus Cogens Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Siderman De Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 503, 513 (1993). Ajus cogens norm is binding on all states absolutely, irrespective of
states' consent. Id. Thus, the Restatement treats jus cogens norms as "peremptory" since
"no derogation from them is permissible." Id.; David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention:
Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 618 (1995). Accordingly, since jus cogens norms
constitute "a body of higher law," they "automatically prevail[ ] in the event of any conflict
between states." Id.
158 See Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 53. Article 53 of the Convention declares
that:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character."
Id.; see also Mayer-Schonberger & Foster, supra note 156, at 92. Jus cogens norms are
"characterized as having the effect of an international constitution." Id. As a result, any
"[ilnternational law violating such peremptory norms is void, as are national laws that
violate the national constitution." Id. But see Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political
Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2261
(1997). As demonstrated by the "jurisdictional principle applied to acts of genocide,... [tihe
jus cogens prohibition of genocide.., is broader than the [Genocide] Convention's prohibi-
tion [.]" Id.
159 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Second part of its Seven-
teenth Session and on its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprinted in
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (declaring that "[a]
treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which
no derogation is permitted.. ."); Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 416 (reaffirming that
"binding nature ofjus cogens limits the substance of valid treaties or international agree-
ments" thereby rendering "agreements that conflict with its norms void"); see also Kha Q.
Nguyen, In Defense of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the Capital Punishment of
Juveniles in the United States, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 401, 416 (1996) (explain-
ing that "jus cogens norms invalidate all state actions that are inconsistent with their
terms" since aim of former is to "preserve the fundamental interests of the community of
nations").
160 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2, 4. By allowing themselves to be bound by U.N. treaties,
member States presumably "concede" or cede in part their sovereign orjus cogens right to
self-determination. Id.; see also id. at art. 2. Paragraph 6 of Article 2 states that the U.N.'s
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concede that the jus cogens-like "right to one's homeland is a nec-
essary prerequisite to the enjoyment of most other human
rights."16 1 The denial of the right to live in one's homeland by
forced dislocation, then, implicates the inalienable right to self-
determination, in clear abrogation of jus cogens or "peremptory
norms" of international law. 162 Furthermore, the forcible expul-
sion from one's homeland, along with deprivation of self-determi-
nation, also involves the concomitant deprivation of internation-
ally recognized civil, political, and sociocultural rights.163 It is
therefore submitted that such principals should be embraced with
caution-as exemplified by the scourge of war crimes and disloca-
tion visited upon Bosnians.
member organizations: "[Sihall ensure that states which are not Members of the United
Nations act in accordance with [the UN Charter's principles] so far as may be necessary for
the maintenance of international peace and security." Id. art. 2, para. 6. Further, through
Paragraph 1 of Article 48, member nations agree that: "The actions required to carry out
the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations..." Id. at art. 48, para 1. But
see id. art. 51. Notwithstanding the foregoing declarations, Article 51 clarifies that: "Noth-
ing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member nation of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secur-
ity." Id.
161 See Alfred De Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 CRIM. L.F. 257, 257-258 (1995)
(recognizing that without right to one's homeland, persons can be deprived of right to exer-
cise civil, political, and cultural rights); William A Schroeder, Nationalism, Boundaries and
the Bosnian War: Another Perspective, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 153, 158 (1994) (noting how Serbs,
similar to Jews of WWII, only "see safety" when their land is not occupied by others); id. at
159 (stating that forcing people off their land is common, widespread and established); see
also Hector Gros-Espiell, Self-Determination and Jus Cogens, in U.N. LAw/FuNDAmENTAL
RIGHTS 167 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979) (discussing that denial of right to live in one's
homeland necessarily entails violation of such rights as right to self-determination, which
many consider to bejus cogens, or peremptory norm of international law); Tyagi, supra note
16, at 884-86 (discussing growing concern to protect human rights globally in retrospect of
past crisis); cf. Roger J.R. Levesque, Future Visions of Juvenile Justice: Lessons from Inter-
national and Comparative Law, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1563, 1569 (1996) (stating that "in-
ternational human rights law no longer limited to laws between nations").
162 See De Zayas, supra note 161, at 257-58 (positing that denial of right to homeland
violates individual human rights); GRos-EsPIELL, supra note 161, at 167 (denying individu-
als' right to homeland violates right of self-determination); Weisburd, supra note 49, at 1-9
(asserting that U.S. and Security Council of U.N. are promoting formula for settling conflict
which requires acquiescence to acts which are ofjus cogens character); see also Human
Rights Rapporteur, supra note 154, at 6-7 (explaining that Serbs systematically performed
"ethnic cleansing" under guise of "self-determination" tactic to create their own nation-
state).
163 See Christopher M. Goebel, A Unified Concept of Population Transfer (Revised), 22
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 22-23 (1993) (recognizing that people are deprived of funda-
mental human rights when removed from their homeland); Alan C. Laifer, Note, Never
Again? The "Concentration Camps" in Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Legal Analysis of Human
Rights Abuses, 2 NEw EuR. L. REV. 159, 171 (1994) (arguing that such removal is not only
deprivation of human rights but also constitutes genocide); see also De Zayas, supra note
161, at 270 (asserting that right to one's homeland is "human right").
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1. "The Jus Cogens Paradox": The Faux-Pas of Self-
Determination
In the case of Bosnia, the jus cogens principles of the right to
one's homeland or to "self-determination" have operated on two
levels: both as distorted tools rationalizing the unjustifiable ends
of genocide, and as impediments to carrying out international jus-
tice. 164 Specifically, the atrocities visited on Bosnian civilians in
asserting a jus cogens-like right to "ethnic self-determination" in
the name of a new homeland have really been an overt campaign
of genocidal "ethnic cleansing."165 As such, under a jus cogens
analysis, these humanitarian law violations have fallen outside
the purview of international impunity normally accorded sover-
eign acts of self-determination. 166 Accordingly, this actuality war-
ranted the intervention of an international forum of justice by way
of the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 167 The
burning question which remains unclear, however, is why, in the
164 See Human Rights Rapporteur, supra note 154, at 6-7 (finding that Serbs justified
"ethnic cleansing" atrocities as acts of "self-determination"); Louis R. Beres, On Interna-
tional Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1, 33 (1994) (stating thatjus
cogens has been used to justify assassinations); see also Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compel-
ling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 463 n.137 (1989)
(suggestingjus cogens may be used to justify assassinations).
165 See Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International
Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. CoMP. &
INT'L L. 127, 129-30 (1995) (stating that self-determination claim is fraudulently used tojustify acts of genocide in Bosnia); Weisburd, supra note 49, at 41-42 (asserting that self-
determination rules are part ofjus cogens and Bosnian genocides are violative of both); see
also Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
U.N. Secretary-General, at 72, U.N. Doc. A148/92 (1992) (describing rape as tool of "ethnic
cleansing," Special Rapporteur reported: "'rape has been used as one method to terrorize
civilian populations in villages and forcing ethnic groups to leave"); Jordan J. Paust, The
Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 147, 153-54 (1996) (stating that genocide crimes in former Yugoslavia are viola-
tions of jus cogens).
166 See De Zayas, supra note 161, at 295 (noting that "ethnic cleansing in former Yugo-
slavia can be prosecuted as crime against humanity" which "constitutes genocide within
the meaning of the Genocide Convention"). See generally Antonio Cassese, The Self-Deter-
mination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 92 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981)
(acknowledging international human rights violations as not falling under states' sovereign
immunity protection).
167 See Tamara L. Tomkins, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeak-
able, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 845, 850 (1995) (stating that conceded purpose of war crimes
tribunal is to mete out retribution and punishment so as to deter future atrocities); Michael
D. Greenberg, Note, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 119, 133-
34 (1992) (stating that such Court would achieve purpose, but also would only be applicable
to limited conflicts); see also Tomkins, supra, at 851 (clarifying that despite their conceded
deterrence purposes, future international tribunals "interested in prosecuting rape [as a
war crime], but unwilling, or unable, to acknowledge the circumstances which gave rise to
it,... may actually serve to legitimize the notion that rape is... an inevitable byproduct of
war"').
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wake of the Tribunal's identification and indictment of the mas-
terminds behind the Bosnian genocide, there have not been any
formal attempts to enforce the arrest warrants for these undis-
puted criminals. 168 It is submitted that the answer once again lies
within the principle ofjus cogens' 69-which can be easily manipu-
lated and subverted as an ideological ploy by a sovereign state in
circumventing the enforcement of "customary" international law
against itself.
Customary international law has been described as "the general
practice of states which, over a period of time, become[s] binding
law through repetition and adoption."'7 0 In this light, jus cogens
norms are also viewed as "the highest rules of [customary] inter-
168 See Anthony Lewis, Winking at Karadzic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at A19. It is
argued that by not sanctioning ICTY arrest warrants, the Clinton administration sought to
avoid a political blow-up in Bosnia and to not "rock the boat" before Election Day. Id. The
U.S. forces' affirmative decision not to execute the War Crimes Tribunal arrest warrant
against Karadzic, who had been traveling freely in clear view of international peace-keep-
ing authorities, destroyed all that was achieved at the Dayton Peace Conference, and
amounted to "stand[ing] by while the inventors of 'ethnic cleansing' continue[d] that mur-
derous process and mock[ed] justice for themselves." Id.; see also Kenneth S. Gallant, Sub-
stantive and Procedural Issues: Securing the Presence of Defendant's Before the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557,
565 (1994). The Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide that if, within a rea-
sonable amount of time, no action is taken on arrest warrants, then the Security Council is
to take steps to rectify the situation. Id.; Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforce-
ment of Humanitarian Law: Reflections on the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia, 6 DuKE J. COMp. & INT'L L. 79, 90-91 (1995). The execution of arrest war-
rants are to be done with due diligence, according to the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. Id. See generally Bruce Zagaris, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 33
I.L.M. 484 (1994). Zagaris sets forth introductory explanations for and the text of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence under which the ICC will operate. Id.
169 See Gallant, supra note 168, at 567-68 (stating that "jus cogens norm has arisen re-
quiring that states either [prosecute or] extradite" persons accused of crimes); Joyner,
supra note 168, at 91 n.44 (asserting that violation of Rules of Evidence and Procedure's
requirement to enforce warrants could be construed as violation of jus cogens as well);
Nagan, supra note 34, at 129-30 (noting fraudulent use ofjus cogens principle to justify
Bosnian genocide).
170 U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. GAOR, 1st and 2d Sess., Vienna Mar.
26-May 24, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./39/11/ Add. 2 (1971), at 294 (Statement of Mr.
Suarez, Mexican delegate) (arguing further that jus cogens means "those rules which de-
rive from principles that the legal conscience of mankind deem absolutely essential to the
coexistence in the international community"); see also Mark R. Von Sternberg, A Compari-
son of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction and
the "Elementary Dictates of Humanity", 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 156 n.14 (1996) (quoting
Mexican delegate's statement and noting that "term jus cogens is used interchangeably
with such terms as 'peremptory norms' and 'fundamental human rights'"); cf Christopher
P. Cline, Note, Pursuing Native American Rights in International Law Venues: A Jus
Cogens Strategy After Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 42 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 591, 598 (1991) (explaining that this definition focuses on international effect of
jus cogens, but also has individual effect).
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national law," which are binding on all states absolutely. 17' Again,
it is recognized that "[i] f the will of a State conflicts with a jus
cogens norm," the mandatory operation of jus cogens will require
the State to acquiesce to that norm. 172 Ironically, the result in the
Bosnian crisis has been just the opposite: the binding nature of
the jus cogens-like, sovereign right to self-determination has been
turned on its head to thwart the juridical mission of the War
Crimes Tribunal.17  As an illustration, judicial mandates (to
arrest and/or extradite indicted war criminals) have been ignored
where such mandates have contravened even the most dubious
practices (e.g., relocation and "ethnic cleansing") carried out under
the jus cogens-like imprimatur of State "sovereignty."' 74 What is
171 See Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 417. "Once an international norm becomes
jus cogens, it becomes absolutely binding on all states." Id. at 418; Wippman, supra note
157, at 618. "Peremptory norms" or "jus cogens" are deemed innate to humankind and
therefore "nonderogable." Id.; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 156, art. 64. Article
64 provides: "If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id.
172 See W. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory
Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 120, 122 (B.G.
Ramcharan ed., 1985) (noting that jus cogens norms restrict will of states); Parker & Ney-
Ion, supra note 157, at 416 (asserting that jus cogens norms' scope is supra-sovereign); see
also Michael D. Hodges, The Rights and Responsibilities of Using an International Water-
way, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 375, 382 (1995) (stating that jus cogens invalidates conflicting
rules consented to by states in treaties and customs); Von Sternberg, supra note 170, at 152
(noting thatjus cogens has such universally binding authority that states cannot deviate
from its jurisprudential norm); Wippman, supra note 157, at 615 (asserting that because
jus cogens is peremptory in nature it overrides states' laws); Jeanne M. Woods, Presidential
Legislating in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on Extraterritorial
Arrests, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 14 (1996) (stating that all states are bound to respect certain
nonderogable norms, i.e. jus cogens).
173 See John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty,
Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 19-20 (1996) (reporting that
many nations treat War Crimes Tribunal model as "foreign court" and act of sending own
nationals to tribunal is viewed "as extradition to another country rather than complying
with a transfer order of an international tribunal"); Alex C. Lakatos, Evaluating the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Bal-
ancing Witnesses'Needs Against Defendants'Rights, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 909, 922 (1995) (cau-
tioning that given "significant precedential value," ICTY needs "to make every effort to
strive for legitimacy" throughout Balkans and world because if ICTY "is a paper tiger, it
may well do more harm than good"). But see Jordan J. Paust, Peace-Making and Security
Council Powers: Bosnia-Herzegovina Raises International and Constitutional Questions, 19
S. ILL. U. L.J. 131, 140 (1994) (suggesting that ICTY might balk on deciding such questions
as whether "Security Council restraint of self-defense is necessarily impermissibly thwart-
ing of the jus cogens prohibition of aggression"); id. (predicting further that ICTY would
avoid issue as to "whether the more general right of self-defense reflected in Article 51 of
the Charter is itself ajus cogens norm that preempts Security Council powers"); Schmandt,
supra note 51, at 360 (arguing that if ICTY "fails in its mission, the international commu-
nity's lack of commitment may be the overwhelming cause").
174 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 34 (2d ed. 1988) (ex-
plaining that "'jius cogens .., is the notion that there exist some rules of international law
so fundamental that they prohibit acts by states even if such conduct is expressly sanc-
tioned by state consent"); see also Nagan, supra note 34, at 129-30 (stating that self-deter-
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often conveniently overlooked in this process, however, is that
human rights are "supra-sovereign," and therefore must be safe-
guarded above and beyond a state's sovereignty. 17  Nonetheless,
indicted war criminals like Karadzic surely have been made
aware of this catch-22 interplay ofjus cogens vis-A-vis the right to
self determination and no doubt continue to capitalize on it so as
to thwart international justice.1 76 As a result, heinous crimes
against humanity have gone unpunished and continue to mount
well into the next millennium, simply because the international
community has been too blinded by its paper treaties, political cor-
rectness, and protracted deliberations to be burdened with imple-
menting any real solutions. 177
2. Jus Cogens as a Basis for International Jurisdiction
The prosecutorial and enforcement goals of the Yugoslavian
War Crimes Tribunal are incompatible with, and indeed,
mination claim is fraudulently used to justify widespread acts of genocide in Bosnia); Weis-
burd, supra note 49, at 1-9 (asserting that U.N.'s formula for settling Bosnian conflict
would force acquiescence to certain jus cogens violations).
175 See Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 435. To this specific end, Article 1 of the
Geneva Conventions places a duty on the U.S. government to respect and "ensure respect"
of the Conventions, "since such an obligation does not derive only from the Convention
themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions
merely give specific expression." Id.; see also Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Interna-
tional Law, Human Rights, and Latcrit Theory: Civil and Political Rights - an Introduc-
tion, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 223, 226 (1997). The "foundation for human rights" has
been described as "the individual's 'status qua individual' within the international commu-
nity and the dignity and justice owed to persons based upon that status." Id. In this regard,
as fundamental human rights are "indisputably suprasovereign" in nature, "state sover-
eignty [must necessarily] cede[ ] to human rights protections [altogether]." Id. at 241.
176 See Attanasio, supra note 173, at 19-20 (reporting that many nations, e.g., Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, view act of surrendering nationals to ICTY
'as extradition to another country rather than complying with a transfer order of an inter-
national tribunal"); see also Gallant, supra note 113, at 567-68 (discussing extradition and
prosecution and lack of general international law obligation on states to follow such proce-
dures). But see Joyner, supra note 168, at 90-91 (outlining rules of procedure and evidence
adopted by tribunal in 1994).
177 See Dr. Krefsimir Pirfsl, Remarks Made at Pace University School of Law on October
23, 1993, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 69, 76-77 (1994) (asserting that international documents are
too weak in their structure and wording, causing many crimes to go unpunished); Sage R.
Knauft, Note, Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the Propriety of Armed State Responses to
Terrorist Attacks, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. RFv. 763, 769 (1996) (stating that conven-
tions and treaties are valuable steps towards prevention and punishment of terrorism, but
their enactment leaves many crimes unpunished); Brenton L. Saunders, Comment, The
World's Forgotten Lesson: The Punishment of War Criminals in the Former Yugoslavia, 8
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 357, 375 (1994) (stating that international crimes often go unpun-
ished because treaties are written for specific conflict, thus inapplicable to other conflicts);
see also Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 68 (1992) (stating that lack of punishment of many
international crimes is due to there being no state that wishes to exercise jurisdiction).
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subordinate to the higher sovereignty principles behind the jus
cogens norm of Bosnia-Herzegovina's right to national self-deter-
mination. 178 Hence, the justicial efforts of the Tribunal have, as a
practical matter, been thwarted by the primacy of that sover-
eignty's right to national self-determination. 179 The basic obstacle
here lies in the fact that the present War Crimes Tribunal is based
on, draws its authority from, and is therefore limited by existing
UN conventions.' 0 Specifically, the dilemma is that under the
current UN convention establishing the ICTY,' 8 ' this Tribunal's
jurisdictional reach only extends to crimes committed by a state
through its agents, and not to individuals acting autonomously,
outside any official state authority.'8 2 This constraint, by defini-
178 See U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, supra note 68 (proposing establishment of
International War Crimes Tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and geno-
cide in former Yugoslavia). But see O'Shea, supra note 106, at 386 (reporting FRY govern-
ment's position regardless of "supra-sovereignty" argument was that ICTY contravened
anti-extradition provisions of Federal Constitution); id. (noting that in light of absence of
'express legislati[on] or treaty" in U.S. conceding to ICTys extradition authority, U.S. also
likely to follow suit by refusing to comply with any such ICTY order); Saunders, supra note
177, at 375 (predicting that ICTY would "be of little or no utility" in bringing perpetrators
of genocide to justice as "amnesty [would likely] be granted as part of a peace settlement to
all those accused of war crimes").
179 See generally GORMLEY, supra note 172, at 122-23 (noting that principle ofjus cogens
impinges on sovereign self-determination); JANis, supra note 174, at 26-31 (positing that
jus cogens norms supersede supra-sovereign authority). But see Hochkammer, supra note
95, at 154 (asserting that, as ICTY Statute was based on Nuremberg model, which only
provides for prosecution of leaders of defeated nations, where accused war criminal re-
mains in powerful government position, "it will be virtually impossible for [ICTY] to gain
custody of the defendant").
180 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic A/K/A "dule", IT-94-1-AR72, at 12 (Oct. 2, 1995), re-
printed in Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 7 CRIM.
L.F. 51, 51 (1996) (stating that Tribunal is deficient because it was established by resolu-
tion of UN Security Council, and not by treaty, consensual act of nations, or by amendment
to U.N. Charter); Akhavan, supra note 148, at 240-41 (explaining many benefits of estab-
lishing Tribunal by treaty rather than by resolution of Security Council); Judge Richard J.
Goldstone, The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Case Study in Security
Council Action, 6 DuKE J. COMp. & INT'L L. 5, 6 (1995) (suggesting Tribunal would be most
successful if permanently established by treaty); Monroe Leigh, Conference Paper, Evalu-
ating Present Options for an International Criminal Court, 149 MIL. L. REv. 113, 116-17
(1995) (stating that establishment of Tribunal would have stronger legal foundation if by
treaty or convention, rather than how it was done, by resolution of Security Council).
181 See Security Council Resolution 808, supra note 68 (adopting proposal for establish-
ment of "paper" authority War Crimes Tribunal for atrocities committed in area of former
Yugoslavia since 1991); Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 1, adopted as per S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, para. 2, supra note 95 (setting forth actual guidelines for operation
and administration of ICTY).
182 See Von Sternberg, supra note 33, at 155 (noting that "jurisdiction under the Nurem-
berg Charter's provision governing 'crimes against humanity' seems highly vulnerable;" to
wit: as "Bosnian Serbs are not a state party, no official policy of discrimination appears
possible"); see also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 180, at 12 (asserting reasons for
deficiencies of Tribunal that prosecuted Tadic); Saunders, supra note 177, at 375 (asserting
that alleged criminal ringleaders of Balkan atrocities participating in peace initiatives will
likely claim amnesty for themselves and their cronies).
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tion, will forever impede the "evenhanded enforcement" of inter-
national humanitarian law in the Balkans, as individual actors
can always claim that they were either acting pursuant to "orders"
or under the color of law, thereby escaping personal liability for
their acts.iS3 Accordingly, in Bosnia, the justicial goals of humani-
tarian law can best be achieved by a Tribunal that can evenly en-
force international law against all guilty parties-irrespective of
political affiliation or whether their acts were committed in an of-
ficial "state" capacity. 184 Implementing an International Criminal
Court will surpass this very hurdle limiting the current Yugoslav-
ian War Crimes Tribunal's effectiveness.
Criminal violations of jus cogens norms, like ethnic cleansing
and genocide, are unmistakable disruptions of international order,
transcending all State boundaries and local laws, theoretically
compromising the collective human rights of all citizens
therein.' 5 Accordingly, within a jus cogens context, the ideas of
183 See Schmandt, supra note 51, at 351 (comparing current War Crimes Tribunal to
that of Nuremberg and characterizing latter as lacking evenhanded enforcement of inter-
national human rights law); see also Gallant, supra note 113, at 565 (discussing Tribunal's
rules and suggesting improvements of enforcement measures); Saunders, supra note 177,
at 375 (claiming that failure to use principles of international law established at Nurem-
berg allows for continual acts of war crimes); cf. Goldstone, supra note 180, at 6 (describing
tribunals set up under Chapter VII of UN Charter in attempt to establish permanent inter-
national court of criminal justice).
184 See Schmandt, supra note 51, at 351 (stating that Tribunal will be most effective if it
is applied to all parties, thus no immunity for victors); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (asserting that in order to develop international commu-
nity with basic recognition of human dignity, it is essential to temper justice "by compas-
sion rather than by vengeance"). There has been a sense of even treatment by the tribunal,
as there have been indictments of victors and victims. See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 108, at
79-80 (noting that there have been indictments of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and
Serbs); Bosnian Croats Indict Izetbegovic for Genocide, X-UA ENG. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 13,
1996, available in 1996 WL 11989200 (reporting indictment of two Muslim military lead-
ers); Marlise Simons, Conflict in the Balkans: War Crimes: U.N. Tribunal Indicts Bosnian
Serb Leader and Commander, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at A9 (stating that 24 Bosnian
Serbs were indicted by Tribunal for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide);
See generally William Drozdiak, U.N. Crimes Tribunal Indicts Six Bosnian Croats, WASH.
POST, Nov. 14, 1995, at A08, available in 1995 WL 9272304 (reporting arrest of six Bosnian
Croats).
185 See Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 455 (arguing that "jus cogens allows for
universal jurisdiction," and that "It]he idea of universal jurisdiction and individual respon-
sibility for violations of international law developed largely with the laws of war"); see also
Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (declaring
that if violations ofjus cogens are permitted, "ordered society as we know it would cease");
Christopher W. Hafke, Comment, The Torture Victim Protection Act: More Symbol Than
Substance, 43 EMORY L.J. 1467, 1514 (1994) (stating that violations ofjus cogens will dis-
turb international order); Philippe Lieberman, Case Comment, Expropriation, Torture, and
Jus Cogens Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Siderman De Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 503, 538 (1993) (stating that "[v]iolations ofjus
cogens norms disrupt international order[,] they impact all states and all persons").
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"universal jurisdiction" and "individual responsibility" for crimi-
nal violations of international law are inextricably linked; crimi-
nal responsibility attaches personally to those indicted, and is not
limited to the official acts of a state actor.'" 6 As an illustration, the
ad hoc criminal court established under the Nuremberg Charter
formally emphasized imparting "individual responsibility" for vio-
lations of international law.' 8 7 Presiding over the prosecution of
World War II Nazi war criminals, the court reasoned that the es-
sence of the UN Charter establishing its jurisdiction is that an
individual's "international duties" supersede "national obligations
of obedience" imposed by his respective State.' Thus, as an indi-
vidual's jus cogens responsibilities transcend his national bounda-
ries, it follows that jurisdiction over violations of such interna-
tional norms must therefore be treated as universal.18 9
186 See Fogelson, supra note 146, at 895-96 (stating that international violators ofjus
cogens were held individually liable under international law following World War II); Mark
A. Gray, The International Crime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215, 265-66 (1996) (as-
serting that state liability is derived from individuals' actions, thus both must be held lia-
ble); Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 455 (stating that individuals are personally liable
for international violations ofjus cogens); Von Sternberg, supra note 33, at 154 n.158 (re-
porting that idea of individual liability for international law violations developed over time
with laws of war as reinforced in modern era forced by Nuremberg Charter).
187 See Von Sternberg, supra note 33, at 170; see also Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal, in force August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, U.N.T.S. 279, re-
printed in 3 BEvNs 1238, Nuremberg Charter (establishing Nuremberg Tribunal); Fogel-
son, supra note 147, at 895-96 (stating that international violators ofjus cogens were held
individually liable under international law following World War II); Parker and Neylon,
supra note 157, at 455 (stating that tribunal established at end of World War II exercised
jurisdiction over war criminals, individually); Von Sternberg, supra note 170, at 154 n.158
(relating individual liability for international law violations).
188 Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 463 n.293 (citing United States v. Goering, 6
FRD 69, 110 (1946) as relying on Nuremberg Charter, art. 6, 59 Stat. at 1547 and art. 8, 59
Stat. at 1548 in its holding); id. (citing U.S. Army Field Manual Sec. 498, 27-10, The Law of
Land Warfare (1956) ("[any person, whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian,
who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible there-
for and liable to punishment. Such offenses in connection with war comprise: a. crimes
against peace, b. crimes against humanity. c. war crimes . . .").
189 See Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under FSIA: A Proposed Excep-
tion to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV.
365, 410 (1989) (stating that universal jurisdiction permits any nation to exercise jurisdic-
tion over violators of certain fundamental international norms); Fogelson, supra note 146,
at 884-85 (stating that universal jurisdiction is permitted even when international borders
are not crossed, so long as criminal act meets certain threshold); Von Sternberg, supra note
33, at 125 (stating that if conflicts determined to be war international in scope, then univer-
sal jurisdiction can be exercised); see also Parker and Neylon, supra note 157, at 455 (as-
serting that universal jurisdiction and individual responsibility for violations of interna-
tional law developed largely with laws of war).
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Of paramount importance is that a jus cogens violation claim
may be brought without reliance on treaties or conventions. 190
The harm caused by jus cogens violations affects all persons, be
they actual victims, or incidental ones; since all are harmed, all
have standing for redress.191 It is therefore irrelevant whether the
government in question has ratified a particular international
treaty or not. 192 To the foregoing ends, it clearly would be consis-
tent with the mandate of Article VII of the UN Charter to extend
these jus cogens principles of "universal jurisdiction" as the doctri-
nal bases in establishing a permanent and independent Interna-
tional Criminal Court. 93
C. Ushering in a New World Order Under an International
Criminal Court
As a practical matter, future international cooperation must
rest upon shared ideals such as peace, economic prosperity, and
personal security.' 9a Thus, if a "new world order" typifying such
190 David Boling, Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial Army:
Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility?, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAVL L. 533, 568-
569 (1995) (stating that jus cogens is superior to treaties, thus treaties that attempt to
extinguish liability for violations ofjus cogens are deemed void); Karen Parker and Jennifer
F. Chew, Compensation for Japan's World War II War-Rape Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 497, 539 (1994) (stating that treaties that attempt to permitjus cogens viola-
tors to avoid liability are void); Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 449 (noting that a
claim based on jus cogens violations is actionable independent of treaties).
191 See Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 325-28 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion) (stating that standing exists in cases
ofjus cogens violations, even when there is no direct harm inflicted on plaintiff); Beth Gam-
mie, Human Rights Implications of the Export of Banned Pesticides, 25 SETON HALL L. REV.
558, 601 (1994) (stating that International Court of Justice does not restrict standing to
only those people who are suffering due to jus cogens violations); Gray, supra note 186, at
257-58 (stating that all states acquire standing, in cases ofjus cogens violations); Parker
and Neylon, supra note 157, at 454 (arguing that every person has right to standing in
cases of violations ofjus cogens norms). But see Weisburd, supra note 49, at 33-34 (stating
that standing, in cases ofjus cogens violations is limited by Vienna Convention to states
particularly affected by violations only).
192 See Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 448 (stating that jus cogens violations are
actionable even when treaties are enacted to refuse action); see also Boling, supra note 190,
at 569 (noting that treaties that specifically purport to extinguish liability for jus cogens
violations would be void); Parker and Chew, supra note 190, at 539.
193 See Boling, supra note 190, at 569 (noting that treaties are deemed void if they ex-
cuse liability for jus cogens violations); Parker and Chew, supra note 190, at 539 (stating
that if treaties allowing for excusal of liabilities incurred by jus cogens violations were not
voided, it would result in legal catastrophe); Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 449 (not-
ing that "[a] claim based on a jus cogens violation is actionable independently of a treaty
." and that "[i]t is therefore irrelevant whether the government in question has ratified a
particular treaty, whether the treaty is self-executing or not, or whether there is imple-
menting legislation").
194 See Jimmy Gurule, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension
of International Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 457, 494 (1994)
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ideals is to emerge, such an order need serve the overall interests
of the nations of the world at large. 95 Moreover, within the con-
text of international law violations, the jus cogens principle of
"universal jurisdiction" is inextricable from the notion of "individ-
ual responsibility."19 6 To this end, an ICC would serve as an in-
dependent common forum to prosecute such crimes as terrorism,
rape, torture and "ethnic cleansing. "19 7 Accordingly, such court's
prosecutorial power would need to break free of the one-sided, ad
hoc effectiveness which limited the post-World War II "victor's jus-
tice" tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo.198 Empowered with ju-
(stating that "[jinternational cooperation is necessary to maintain world order"); Michael
D. Greenberg, Note, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 119, 126
(1992) (arguing that "[oln a jurisprudential level, an international criminal court could pro-
vide a common forum for the prosecution of crimes which threaten the security of the citi-
zens of all nations"); Alfred P. LeBlanc, Jr., Note, United States v. Alvarez-Machain and
the Status of International Law in American Courts, 53 LA. L. REV. 1411, 1416 (1993)
(claiming that international cooperation and mutual respect between states is vital for suc-
cess of future world order); cf Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: Inter-
national Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNATL L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 377, 418 (1994) (suggesting that, aside from exercising militaristic options,
U.N. could serve as "source of basic services for nongovernmental activity in transnational
society, and a source of basic services for individuals and groups whose governments have
failed them . . .").
195 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 194, at 126 (stating that success of new world order is
contingent upon such order functioning on many levels and benefiting majority of nations);
Schmandt, supra note 51 (arguing world Tribunal's success would hinge on its equal appli-
cation to victors as well as losers); Slaughter, supra note 194, at 418 (delineating non-
aggression alternatives of U.N. in protecting individual human rights as to promote new
world order). See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (promoting imperative of "respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion . . ."); U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (precluding matters of states'
domestic affairs from General Assembly's power of recommendation).
196 See Belsky et al., supra note 189, at 410 (explaining that under concept of universal
jurisdiction violations of certain fundamental international norms will be subject to juris-
diction anywhere); Fogelson, supra note 146, at 884-85 (asserting that where crimes are
universally recognized, opprobrious will fall under universal jurisdiction whereby any state
capturing violator may try and punish such criminal on behalf of all other nations); Von
Sternberg, supra note 33, at 125 (citing examples of violations giving rise to universal juris-
diction); see also Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 455 (stating that violations ofjus
cogens norms disrupt international order, thus affecting all states and persons, therefore
justifying universal jurisdiction).
197 See Greenberg, supra note 142, at 126 (claiming International Criminal Court could
provide forum for punishing crimes which threaten security of citizens of all nations); see
also Gurule, supra note 194, at 494 (describing international law right of territorial sover-
eignty as not absolute); LeBlanc, supra note 194, at 1416 (criticizing Supreme Court's unso-
licited role in international law enforcement).
198 See Greenberg, supra note 142, at 128 (positing what is needed to provide effective
international tribunal); Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 455 (describing essence of
tribunal established by Nuremberg Charter after WWII); see also Leigh, supra note 180, at
116-17 (arguing that Tribunal would have stronger legal foundation if based on treaty
rather than U.N. resolution); Lt. Col. Robert T. Mounts et al., Panel II: War Crimes and
Other Human Rights Abuses in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 387, 419-20
(1995) (stating that Security Council must have been "un-focused" when establishing War
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risdiction over a wide berth of international issues, an ICC would
ensure basic, "supra-sovereign," socioeconomic rights and inter-
ests on a global scale.' 99 Such interests include the promulgation
of a politically neutral criminal court, the deterrence of interna-
tional crime, and the comprehensive compilation of an interna-
tional criminal code.2 °°
The implementation of an ICC, however, will not be without its
problems.2 10 For instance, a primary obstacle to the ICC's creation
will be the development of a common international criminal code
acceptable to a consensus of nations.20 2 Instances of international
conflicts of laws surely would arise rather routinely where some
domestic policy legally acceptable to one nation would be in con-
travention of the laws of another.20 3 Thus, the prospect of one
State being made to face potentially criminal sanctions of other
Crimes Tribunal similar to Nuremberg Tribunal, as it overlooked limited effectiveness of
Nuremberg Tribunal).
199 See Greenberg, supra note 142, at 130 (discussing aspects of international criminal
tribunal and international criminal law); see also Gallant, supra note 113, at 565 (citing
problems arising under Chapter VII of UN Charter); cf Von Sternberg, supra note 33, at
152 (asserting need for universal principle that protects interests deemed "absolutely es-
sential to coexistence in the international community"). See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 1,
para. 3.
200 Greenberg, supra note 142, at 126 (stating these three ideals). See Neil Kritz, Sympo-
sium, Panel II: Comparative Analysis of International and National Tribunals, 12 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. Hum. RTs. 545, 621 (1995) (quoting U.N. Commission of Experts report stating that
international criminal tribunal would have advantages such as "independence, subjectiv-
ity, and impartiality"); see also Leigh, supra note 152, at 116 (observing that while "Draft
Statute does not correspond to any particular criminal justice system" its framers nonethe-
less "attempted to balance different conceptions of criminal justice... to win the support of
the international community").
201 See Bland, supra note 96, at 245 (noting Tribunal's jurisdictional problem of being
unable to grant binding judgments); Santosus, supra note 96, at 44 (explaining that there
are many potential problems with establishing international criminal court, however, they
are all solvable); see also Blakesley, supra note 105, at 78 (noting domestic-international
law rift). But see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal
Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991) (suggesting that any problems that may lie
ahead in regards to international criminal court, have already been considered and essen-
tially solved).
202 See Bassiouni, supra note 139, at 3 (asserting Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were
only beginning stage in development of international criminal system promulgated by way
of permanent international criminal court); see also Blakesley, supra note 105, at 77-80
(conceding need for permanent war crimes tribunal that must meet certain protective crite-
ria); David B. Pickard, Comment, Security Council Resolution 808: A Step Toward a Per-
manent International Court for the Prosecution of International Crimes and Human Rights
Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 435, 441-47 (1995) (noting that primary obstacles to
implementing international criminal court are lack of consensus as to what governing law
should be and stubbornness of nations in refusing to surrender limited sovereignty).
203 See Santosus, supra note 96, at 35-36 (pointing out concerns of state sovereignty and
jurisdiction among individual nations); see also Blakesley, supra note 105, at 78 (noting
domestic-international law rift); Pickard, supra note 202, at 440-43 (describing lack of con-
sensus as obstacle to what governing law should be).
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member States would deter the former from acquiescing to the au-
thority of an international criminal code.20 4 This notwithstanding,
unlike an ad hoc court operating under the restrictions of a UN
convention or treaty, a permanent ICC would settle such jurispru-
dential issues as judicial competence, res judicata and, most im-
portantly, the rights and duties of individuals from a supra-sover-
eign perspective of international law.20 5 Finally, and most
importantly, the lack of an ICC significantly continues to frustrate
the effective enforcement of international human rights laws,
thereby making adherence to Conventions promulgated by the UN
wholly dependent upon the good faith of signatories.20 6
CONCLUSION
The long and bloodied history of the ethnic and territorial
claims that have been violently asserted in Bosnia-Herzegovina
has served as the backdrop for the eruption of decades of pent-up
hatred through a ruthless scourge of rape, torture and genocide.
The UN's delayed preemptive military intervention in curtailing
international human rights violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
the wake of this bloodshed, not only violated that member nation's
right to self-defense, but thereby escalated those instances of ge-
nocide. Further, the failure to enforce the International War
204 See M. CherifBassiouni and Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International
Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 151, 171-
72 (1992) (stating that State refusal to acquiesce could pose problem, however, solutions
have been proposed to overcome such obstacles); Greenberg, supra note 142, at 134 (noting
primary obstacle to creation of international criminal court is development of international
criminal code acceptable to majority of nations). But see Procida, supra note 12, at 669 n.66
(explaining that non-existence of international court hinders full enforcement of Genocide
Convention).
205 See, e.g., Chaney, supra note 99, at 92 (citing pitfalls that ICTY inherited from Nu-
remberg trials as comprising "reliance on ex post facto law.., prejudicial appointment of
judges... [and] selective indictments.. ."); Greenberg, supra note 142, at 141 (commenting
that in view of Iraqi atrocities committed against domestic Kurdish population Sadam
Hussein and high-ranking Iraqi officials were prime candidates subject to ICC jurisdiction);
cf. Lieberman, supra note 157, at 538 (assertingjus cogens violations disrupt international
order); Parker & Neylon, supra note 157, at 455 (stating that "jus cogens allows for univer-
sal jurisdiction").
206 See Procida, supra note 12, at 669 n.66 (discussing generally pitfalls engendered by
absence of permanent ICC); see also Blakesley, supra note 105, at 78 (discussing obstacles
to creation of permanent War Crimes Tribunal due to national-international law rift);
Bourloyannis, supra note 5, at 335 (noting limited effectiveness of U.N.'s first twenty years
in implementing international humanitarian law); Pickard, supra note 202, at 441-47
(describing major problems hindering promulgation of ICC as lack of international consen-
sus and states' refusal to relinquish sovereignty). But see Bassiouni, supra note 139, at 1
(suggesting problems regarding international criminal court already essentially solved).
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Crimes Tribunal's indictments of war criminals has further com-
promised the UN's credibility and authority in the ambit of world
affairs.
The "evenhanded enforcement" of international human rights
law must take precedence over the one-sided prosecution of war
criminals so as to avoid the danger of dispensing a skewered
"victor's justice." This danger will be effectively averted by the im-
plementation of an ICC. The authority of such a court would also
insure the proper operation of universal jus cogens norms in al-
lowing Bosnia to realize its own self-determination as a sovereign
state. Since jus cogens rights and obligations extend beyond na-
tional boundaries, jurisdiction over violations of these rights will
be universal and actionable independent of any treaties. The jus
cogens principles of supra-sovereign, universal jurisdiction can be
readily extended to serve as the doctrinal bases for a permanent
ICC in upholding universal human rights norms.
The promulgation of the International War Crimes Tribunal
was a much-needed first step in curbing the ever-present specter
of "ethnic cleansing" and in bolstering the re-enfranchisement of
the UN's authority. An autonomous ICC, however, superseding
the existing "paper" authority scope of the UN's ICTY and ICTR,
will clearly be required in order to restore credibility in the UN's
authority and to elevate it to the deserved status of final arbiter of
international affairs in the advancement of a New World Order.
Rocco P. Cervoni
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